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THE SOCIETAL VALUE OF PRESCRIPTION
DRUG ADVERTISEMENTS IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM: TARGETED CONSUMERS
BECOME THE LEARNED
Caroline L. Nadal*
INTRODUCTION
In a majority of jurisdictions throughout the United States, a
prescription drug manufacturer will not be liable to the ultimate
drug consumer when it has heavily advertised its product to that
consumer yet failed to provide adequate warnings of the dangers
associated with its use.' Under the learned intermediary doctrine,2
the manufacturer absolves itself from liability by providing
*Brooklyn Law School, Class of 2002; B.A. Davidson College 1994. The
author would like to thank Professor Aaron Twerski for his guidance. The author
would also like to thank her husband for his continuing support.
See, e.g., In re Norplant Contraceptive Prod. Litig., 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir.
1999) (affirming summary judgment for defendant manufacturer despite its
aggressive marketing of contraceptive devices to consumers); Skill v. Martinez,
91 F.R.D. 498 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding that the court properly instructed the jury
that the prescription drug manufacturer's duty did not extend to the consumer of
oral contraceptives); Martin v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. 1996)
(affirming summary judgment for the defendant drug manufacturer when the
plaintiff argued that the manufacturer had a duty to warn consumers directly);
Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 3 S.W.3d 404 (Mo. App. 1999) (holding that,
despite advertising in Newsweek magazine, a pharmaceutical manufacturer did
not have a duty to warn consumers directly). The same rule equally applies to
medical implants. See, e.g., Rosci v. AcroMed, Inc., 669 A.2d 959 (Pa. 1999)
(applying learned intermediary doctrine when the plaintiff brought suit against
the manufacturer of surgically implanted bone plates and screws).
2 The phrase, "learned intermediary," was coined in Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966). The Eighth Circuit stated that "the
purchaser's doctor is a learned intermediary between the purchaser and the
manufacturer." Id. (emphasis added).
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adequate warnings to the prescribing physician, i.e. the "learned
intermediary.",3 Thus, the physician is left bearing the legal
obligation to adequately warn of the dangers and various side
effects of prescription medication.4 This doctrine operates under
the assumption that the prescribing physician makes an informed
decision for the patient by balancing her medical diagnosis and
history with the benefits and risks of the chosen drug.5 Prescription
drugs and their associated side effects, according to the doctrine,
are complicated beyond the average consumer's comprehension.6
As such, the physician, and not the patient, appropriately chooses
the prescription medication and thus bears the legal burden to warn
patients of associated dangers.7
Recently, however, prescription drug manufacturers have
undertaken multi-million dollar ad campaigns to promote their
products to the public-at-large. 8 Clearly, prescription drug manu-
facturers feel that consumers are playing important roles in
deciding the prescription drugs they take.9 For the pharmaceutical
companies, these direct-to-consumer ("DTC") advertisements serve
3 See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974)
("Pharmaceutical companies ... in selling prescription drugs are required to
warn only the prescribing physician, who acts as the 'learned intermediary'
between manufacturer and consumer.").
4 id.
' See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing assumption that
learned physicians make informed choices concerning prescription drugs).
6 See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (describing the complications
of the average patient trying to comprehend the complexities of prescription
medications); see also infra note 169 (parleying various medical terminology
used in describing side effects and contraindications associated with prescription
drugs).
7 See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding
that the physician is best situated to warn patients of risks associated with
prescription medications); see also infra notes 54-59 (discussing the rationale
behind the learned intermediary doctrine).
8 See infra notes 145-63 and accompanying text (observing the recent
increases in money spent on prescription drug advertisements).
9 Experimenting with Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, LANCET, Aug. 19,
2000 (noting the recent increase in the sales of prescription drugs, especially
those heavily advertised); see also infra notes 145-63 (discussing the increase in
funds spent on direct-to-consumer advertising).
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financial purposes by encouraging patients to ask their physicians
for the marketed products.'1 For consumers/patients, such market-
ing suggests a movement in an evolving health care system where
patients are making decisions that doctors used to make for
them." Patients are now receiving the information, formerly sent
only to physicians, via print ads, television and radio commercials,
and Internet sites. 12 As a result, they are taking charge of their
own personal health care and are more often choosing the prescrip-
tion drugs they take. 13
In light of these recent changes, courts and scholars have begun
questioning whether the learned intermediary doctrine should be
strictly applied when a drug manufacturer engages in DTC
marketing.' 4 A number of courts have already recognized excep-
tions to the doctrine when the drug in question was distributed for
mass immunizations or contraception."' An exception, courts have
reasoned, is warranted when the physician and patient are not able
10 See Tamar V. Terzian, Note, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug
Advertising, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 149, 157 (1999) (noting that "physicians state
that they are increasingly asked and pressured by their patients to prescribe drugs
that the patient has seen advertised"); see also infra note 147 (likening DTC
advertising to the promotion of toys and cereal to children).
" See infra notes 122-44 and accompanying text (discussing recent changes
in the American health care system).
12 See infra notes 145-63 and accompanying text (explaining how pharma-
ceutical manufacturers are now reaching out to consumers directly); see also
infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text (discussing how patients now ask
physicians for specific prescription medications as a result of these advertise-
ments).
1" See infra notes 195-208 and accompanying text (describing the benefits
of DTC advertisements on consumers' awareness).
14 See, e.g., Yonni D. Fushman, Comment, Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc.:
Toward Creating a Direct-to-Consumer Advertisement Exception to the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine, 80 B.U. L. REv. 1161, 1183 (2000) (noting that an
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine is warranted when the manufactur-
er has engaged in DTC because the manufacturer can reach the masses with
warnings); Nancy K. Plant, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Some New
Medicine for an Old Ailment, 81 IOWA L. REv. 1007, 1078 (1996) (advocating
abrogation of the learned intermediary doctrine in favor of a informed consent
approach in light of health care changes in society).
"5 See infra notes 65-118 and accompanying text (listing and discussing the
cases that have allowed for such exceptions).
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to develop a strong relationship and when the patient has exercised
independent judgment in choosing the drug he or she takes. 16 In
its 1999 decision, Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories,17 the New Jersey
Supreme Court was the first to create an exception to the learned
intermediary doctrine when a pharmaceutical manufacturer has
engaged in DTC advertising.' 8 The Perez Court, like the courts
adopting exceptions for mass immunization and contraceptives,
found an exception warranted because under the current health care
system physicians are spending less time with patients.' 9 Further,
patients are receiving more information directly from the pharma-
ceutical manufacturers, and are becoming empowered to ask their
physicians for specific drugs.20 The Perez decision, however, is
only a limited victory for future plaintiffs. 2' The New Jersey
Supreme Court places the burden on the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant manufacturers blatantly disregarded the guidelines of the
16 See infra notes 65-118 and accompanying text (explaining the rationale
that has led courts to adopt exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine).
17 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).
1" Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court stated the following:
We believe that when mass marketing of prescription drugs seeks to
influence a patient's choice of a drug, a pharmaceutical manufacturer
that makes direct claims to the consumer for the efficacy of its product
should not be unqualifiedly relieved of a duty to provide proper
warnings of the dangers or side effects of the product.
Id. at 1247.
'9 Id. at 1256-57.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1259 (holding that plaintiff can only rebut this presumption by
demonstrating deliberate non-compliance or concealment by the defendant
manufacturer); see also William A. Dreier, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
Liability: An Empty Gift to Plaintiffs, 30 SETON HALL L. REv. 806, 825 (2000)
(opining that, because under Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories New Jersey requires
a plaintiff to prove that the pharmaceutical manufacturer blatantly disregarded
FDA regulations in DTC advertisements, plaintiffs will have difficulties getting
past defendants' summary judgment motions).
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FDA.2 2 This places a great burden on a plaintiff and renders an
outcome in her favor unlikely.
23
Although the standard set forth in Perez creates an exception to
the learned intermediary doctrine, like New Jersey, other courts
will increasingly face the issue of whether the learned intermediary
doctrine should apply when a prescription drug manufacturer has
engaged in heavy DTC marketing. Courts should give considerable
weight to the social benefits and harms of DTC marketing.
Advocates of DTC argue that such marketing increases consumer
awareness, reduces disease-associated stigmas, and enables patients
to take charge of their own health care. 24 Critics, on the other
hand, believe that the ads provide complicated and misleading
information to patients who are not medically trained to weigh the
risks and benefits of specific prescription drugs.25 Courts viewing
DTC marketing as ultimately beneficial should either refuse to
create an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine or should
create only a limited exception in order not to dissuade manufactur-
ers from advertising.26
This Note outlines four options for courts to consider when
facing the difficult question of whether to adopt an exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine. Courts can take one of the four
following approaches: (1) reject creating an exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine; (2) allow an exception to the learned
intermediary doctrine, but create a strong rebuttable presumption
requiring a plaintiff to prove that the manufacturer intentionally
failed to comply with FDA guidelines through conscious conceal-
ment or failure to disclose subsequently acquired harmful product
information;27 (3) allow an exception to the learned intermediary
22 Id. FDA Guidelines regulating DTC advertising of prescription drugs falls
under 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2000); see also infra notes 164-74 and accompanying
text (detailing this regulation).
23 See Dreier, supra note 21, at 825.
24 See infra notes 195-208 and accompanying text (setting forth the social
benefits of DTC marketing).
25 See infra notes 209-27 and accompanying text (setting forth the social
harms of DTC marketing).
26 See infra notes 260-61 and accompanying text (opining that an open-ended
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine would dissuade DTC advertising).
27 This is the resolution New Jersey adopted in Perez, 734 A.2d at 1259.
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doctrine, but create a weaker rebuttable presumption requiring
plaintiff only to show that the manufacturer did not comply with
FDA guidelines; or (4) create an exception to the learned interme-
diary doctrine regarding noncompliance with FDA regulations as
presumptive but not determinative of liability. In weighing all the
factors, courts should conclude that the third option presents the
optimal results. In holding manufacturers to the standards that the
FDA has set forth, courts will not dissuade DTC advertising but
will encourage pharmaceutical manufacturers to advertise more
responsibly within the guidelines the FDA has set forth. 8
Part I of this Note discusses the background of the learned
intermediary doctrine to include the underlying rationale behind the
doctrine and the exceptions that courts have recognized over the
years. Part II discusses the changes that have occurred in health
care over the past two decades and the impacts these changes have
had on the physician-patient relationship. Moreover, this section
addresses the massive boom of DTC marketing by pharmaceutical
manufacturers and the different advertisement mediums, including
the governing FDA regulations. Finally, Part III of this Note
considers the social benefits and harms of the existing DTC
advertisements in conjunction with the policy arguments behind the
four approaches laid out above to conclude that the third approach,
creating a weak rebuttable presumption against the plaintiff, is the
optimal choice for courts to adopt.
I. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION OF THE
LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE
A majority of courts have embraced the learned intermediary
doctrine, setting forth the rule that manufacturers of prescription
drugs are shielded from liability when they have adequately warned
the prescribing physician.29 This is a departure from the general
products liability principle that manufacturers owe a duty to
reasonably warn consumers of dangers associated with the products
28 See infra notes 269-71 and accompanying text (explaining why the third
option presents the optimal solution for courts to follow).
29 See supra note 1.
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they place on the market.3° The learned intermediary doctrine has
been rationalized on several grounds. 3' First, prescription drugs
are complex and idiosyncratic in how they react to the human
body, and consumers can only acquire them through physicians'
prescriptions.32 Thus, physicians and not consumers are better
suited to weigh the risks and benefits of the medications and
provide necessary warnings to patients.33 Courts, however, have
recognized an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine in
mass immunization settings where consumers do not have the
opportunity to receive adequate warnings from physicians.34 A
smaller number of court have allowed for an exception for
contraceptives, reasoning that a healthy patient chooses her method
of contraception independent of a physician's input.35 The New
Jersey Supreme Court is the first court to recognize an exception
when the pharmaceutical company has engaged in DTC market-
ing.36
A. General Tort Principles and the Rationale Behind the
Learned Intermediary Doctrine
Manufacturers have a duty to warn consumers about possible
risks associated with the products they place in the market.37 The
30 See infra notes 37-48 and accompanying text (detailing general products
liability principles).
31 See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale
behind the doctrine).
32 See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (describing the complications
of the average patient in trying to comprehend the complexities of prescription
medications).
13 See Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276 (holding that the physician is best situated
to warn patients of risks associated with prescription medications).
34 See infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text (discussing the exception for
mass immunizations).
31 See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (discussing the exception for
contraceptives).
36 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1259.
37 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(c) (1998) states
the following:
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purposes behind warnings are twofold.38 First, they instruct
consumers on proper use of a product to reduce the risks of injuries
resulting from misuse.3 9 Second, they enable the consumer to
make an informed choice to use the product and face exposure to
the risks.4° Prescription drugs fall into a special class of products
[A product] is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions
or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
Id.
One uncertainty that courts have faced is whether failure to warn claims
sound in strict liability or negligence. See Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas
Corp., 53 Cal. 3d 987 (1991) (holding that under strict liability failure to warn,
plaintiffs must show that the defendant manufacturer knew or should have known
of the unwarned risks). Cf. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d
539 (N.J. 1982) (holding manufacturers strictly liable for failing to warn of risks
that were scientifically unknowable at the time of manufacture). Many courts
recognize the confusion generated between negligence and strict liability
principles that manufacturers should only be liable for those risks it knew or
should have known; however, the Restatement (Third) and most courts require
the plaintiffs to prove that manufacturers knew or should have known of the
associated risks. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. §2 cmt. m;
see also Vassallo v. Baxter Health care Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 923 (Mass. 1998)
(adopting the approach of the Restatement (Third) in holding that manufacturer
could not be held liable for unforeseeable hazards).
Furthermore, under common law tort doctrine, courts do not hold
manufacturers liable for warning against obvious dangers associated with a
product. See, e.g., Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.
1957) (holding that manufacturer of a rubber exercise rope did not have a duty
to warn plaintiff of the rope snapping back and causing injury).
38 See JAMES A. HENDERSON & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
PRODUCTS AND PROCESS 337 (4th ed. 2000) (introducing distinctions between
warnings and instructions manufacturers provide consumers).
39 Id.
40 Id.; see also, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. §2 cmt. i
(1998).
Such warnings allow the user or consumer to avoid the risk warned
against by making an informed decision not to purchase or use the
product at all and hence not to encounter the risk. In this context,
warnings must be provided for inherent risks that reasonably foresee-
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deemed "unavoidably unsafe" under the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.4' All prescription drugs pose hazards, whether minute or
great, to consumers. 42 However, these same drugs cure life-
threatening diseases, remedy crippling mental-illnesses, alleviate
physical aches, pains, and provide numerous other benefits.43 Our
society has come to accept the bad with the far-surpassing good.'
Both Restatement (Second) of Torts and the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability recommend that prescription drug
manufacturers not be held strictly liable for failing to warn of
able product users and consumers would reasonably deem material or
significant in deciding whether to use or consume the product. Whether
or not many persons would, when warned, nonetheless decide to use
or consume the product, warnings are required to protect the interests
of those reasonably foreseeable users or consumers who would, based
on their own reasonable assessments of the risks and benefits, decline
product use or consumption.
Id.
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A cmt. k (1965).
There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs
.... Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper
directions and warnings, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous.
Id.
42 Penicillin, the antibiotic heralded as one of the greatest medical
discoveries of the twentieth century, has a number of dangers associated with its
use. Penicillin, The Wonder Drug, at http://www.botany.hawaii.edu/faculty/-
wong/BOT135/Lect2lb.htm (last visited on Feb. 6, 2001). Among listed potential
hazards is a proportionately rare occurrence of shock and/or seizures, and more
common side effects of nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. See OnHealth, What Are
the Possible Side Effects of Penicillin V?, at http://www.onhealth.webmd.com/-
conditions/resource/pharmacy/multum8/item,73027.asp (last visited Sept. 16,
2000).
43 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A cmt. k (1965) ("An
outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not
uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is
injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the
marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified.").
44id.
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unknown, potential dangers,45 and most jurisdictions follow this
guidance.46 Recognizing that imposing strict liability would likely
curb manufacturers' research and development of new and valuable
drugs, courts have adopted a negligence standard, imposing liability
only when prescription drug manufacturers have acted unreasonably
in failing to warn of dangers they knew or should have known.47
Further, courts have also extended a manufacturer's duty to warn
only to the prescribing physician and not the ultimate consumer.48
With the birth of the learned intermediary doctrine, prescription
drug manufacturers have become insulated from numerous
liabilities.49 The California appellate courts were among the first
to create a "no duty" rule for prescription drug manufacturers,
holding that the manufacturers did not have a legal obligation to
" Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m
(1998).
The issue of foreseeability of risk of harm is more complex in the case
of products such as prescription drugs, medical devices, and toxic
chemicals. Risks attendant to use and consumption of these products
may, indeed, be unforeseeable at the time of sale. Unforeseeable risks
arising from foreseeable product use or consumption by definition
cannot adequately be warned against. Thus, in connection with a claim
of inadequate design, instruction, or warning, plaintiff should bear the
burden of establishing that the risk in question was known or should
have been known to the relevant manufacturing community.
Id.
46 See, e.g., Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare, 696 N.E. 909 (Mass. 1998)
(embracing the position of the Restatement (Third) in joining the majority of
jurisdictions that foreseeability is relevant to a failure to warn claim).
41 Id. Dean Prosser aptly stated the following:
The argument that industries producing potentially dangerous products
should make good the harm, distribute it by liability insurance, and add
the cost to the price of the product, encounters reason for pause, when
we consider that two of the greatest medical boons to the human race,
penicillin and cortisone, both have their dangerous side effects, and
that drug companies might well have been deterred from producing and
selling them.
JOHN W. WADE ET. AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 749 (9th ed. 1994).
48 See supra note 1 (listing supporting cases).
49 See supra note 1 (listing supporting cases).
460
DIRECT TO CONSUMER ADVERTISEMENTS
warn consumers of the hazards associated with their products.5"
Doctors who prescribe the drugs and who have direct patient
contact are in a superior position to provide necessary information
and warnings.5" The reporters of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability also recognize the learned intermediary rule as
a sound products liability doctrine.52
The rationale behind the learned intermediary doctrine is best
illustrated in the oft-quoted passage from Reyes v. Wyeth Laborato-
ries:
Prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines,
esoteric in formula and varied in effect. As a medical
expert, the prescribing physician can take into account the
propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of
his patient. His is a task of weighing the benefits of any
medication against its potential dangers. The choice he
makes is an informed one, an individualized medical
judgment bottomed on a knowledge of both patient and
palliative.53
Furthermore, courts have universally embraced the learned
intermediary doctrine for four reasons.54 First, the complexities of
50 See Love v. Wolf, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 193 (1964) ("[I]f adequate warning
of potential dangers of a drug has been given to doctors, there is no duty by the
drug manufacturer to insure that the warning reaches the doctor's patient for
whom the drug is prescribed."); Magee v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 322
(1963) (holding that adequate warning to a physician relieves the manufacturer
of liability).
1 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
52 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6 (d) (1998) ("A
prescription drug or device is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions
or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of
harm are not provided to ... prescribing and other health care providers who are
in a position to reduce the risks of harm.").
" Id. at 1276; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6
cmt. b (1998) ("The rationale supporting this 'learned intermediary' rule is that
only health care professionals are in a position to understand the significance of
the risks involved and to assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of a
given for of presciption-based therapy.").
" See Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing
the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REv. 141, 156-59 (1997)
(discussing the rationale behind the learned intermediary doctrine in arguing that
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prescription medications combined with the intricate structure of
the human body and the peculiarities of specific diseases and
ailments preclude average consumers from fully comprehending
manufacturers' warnings. Physicians, secondly, have technical
training and expertise to heed warnings and caution patients of
dangers associated with prescription medications.56 Moreover,
because a physician has direct contact with a patient, he or she can
more accurately weigh the risks and benefits of a specific medica-
tion with the patient's ailment and medical history.57 Third, the
learned intermediary doctrine helps to preserve the physician-
patient relationship and the important deference and reverence that
patients cede to doctors.58 Finally, prescription drug manufacturers
are unable to reach directly all potential consumers with informa-
tion about their products and, thus they are incapable of appropri-
ately conveying necessary warnings.59
an exception should not be permitted for DTC advertising).
15 See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir. 1989)
("[T]he information regarding risks is often too technical for a patient to make
a reasonable choice."); Reaves v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1290
(E.D. Mich. 1991) ("As with other prescription drugs, patients are unlikely to
understand technical medical information regarding the nature and propensities
of oral contraceptives.").
56 See, e.g., Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984)
("[Tihe question of [adhering to the learned intermediary doctrine] turns on who
is in a better position to disclose risks."); Martin v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 661
N.E.2d 352, 357 (Ill. 1996) ("[P]rescribing physicians, and not pharmaceutical
manufacturers, are in the best position to provide direct warnings to patients
concerning the dangers associated with prescription drugs."); Terhune v. A.H.
Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 978 (Wash. 1978) (holding that a physician is better
able to provide a patient with a thorough, adequate warning).
57 See Noah, supra note 54, at 158.
58 See, e.g., Swayze v. McNeil Labs., 807 F.2d 464, 471 (9thCir. 1988) ("In
all likelihood, such warnings [directly to consumers] would ... perhaps
undermine the physician-patient relationship. When the physician-patient
relationship does exist, as here, we hesitate to encourage, much less require, a
drug manufacturer to intervene in it."); Dunkin v. Syntax Labs., 443 F. Supp.
121, 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) ("[A]ttempts to give detailed warnings to patients
could mislead patients and might also tend to interfere with the physician/patient
relationship.").
59 See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968)
("[I]t is difficult... for the manufacturer, by label of direct communications, to
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B. Extensions and Exceptions
A number of courts have allowed for some flexibility in the
somewhat unyielding learned intermediary doctrine in order to
adapt to the changes in health care and prescription drug develop-
ments. 6° A few courts have extended the pharmaceutical manufac-
turer's duty to warn to other health care professionals such as
nurses.61 Most courts, furthermore, have allowed for an exception
for mass immunizations, and many fewer courts have done the
same when the drug in question is used for contraceptive purpos-
es.62 Only one court to date has created an exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine when the manufacturer has engaged
in DTC advertising.63 When a court creates such an exception, the
manufacturer has a duty to directly warn the consumer.64
1. Mass Immunizations
In 1968 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit recognized the first major exception to the learned interme-
reach the consumer with a warning."); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d
975, 978 (1978) ("[lIt is ordinarily difficult for the manufacturer to communicate
directly with the consumer."). But see Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255-56 ("[H]aving
spent $1.3 billion on advertising in 1998 ... drug manufacturers can hardly be
said to 'lack effective means to communicate directly with patients."' (quoting
Noah, supra, note 54, at 158)).
o See infra notes 65-118 and accompanying text (detailing exceptions to the
learned intermediary doctrine).
61 See, e.g., Rohrbough v. Wyeth Labs., 719 F. Supp. 470, 478 (N.D. W. Va.
1989) (designating registered nurses who administered vaccines as learned
intermediaries); Walker v. Merck & Co., 648 F. Supp. 931 (M.D. Ga. 1986)
(holding licensed practicing nurses administering vaccinations as learned
intermediaries). Predominately, however, the courts have rejected extending the
manufacturer's duty to pharmacists. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 628 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Penn. 1986); Jones v. Irvin, 602 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.
Ill. 1985); Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 40 Cal.3d 672 (1985).
62 See infra notes 65-96 and accompanying text (detailing these exceptions).
63 See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999); see also infra notes
97-118 (providing the background of this case).
64 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1259.
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diary doctrine.65 In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, the court
acknowledged that the manufacturer of the Sabin polio vaccine had
a duty to warn directly a recipient of the vaccine at a mass
immunization clinic.66 Mr. Davis developed polio and became
paralyzed from the waist down after receiving the Type III polio
vaccine. 67 He brought suit against the manufacturer of the mass
vaccine alleging, inter alia, that the manufacturer had a direct duty
to warn him of the dangers of resulting paralysis. 68 The Court
agreed, likening mass immunizations at a clinic to the purchasing
of over-the-counter medication. 69 The underlying assumptions of
the learned intermediary doctrine were not present in this mass
65 Davis, 399 F.2d at 121.
66 Id. at 130. The Davis court stated the following:
We conclude that the facts of this case imposed on the manufacturer
a duty to warn the consumer (or make adequate provision for his being
warned) as to the risks involved, and that failure to meet this duty
rendered the drug unfit in the sense that it was thereby rendered
unreasonably dangerous.
Id.
67 Id. at 122-123. The polio vaccine was created to prevent an individual's
contraction of paralytic poliomyelitis, a crippling disease causing paralysis
primarily in young children. Id. The Type III vaccination, licensed in 1962, was
the first live-virus polio vaccine administered orally. Id.
68 Id. at 124. The Surgeon General had released a warning to health officials
and clinics stating that a higher incidence of paralytic poliomyelitis actually
resulted in adults than children receiving the vaccination. Id. Thus, the Surgeon
General advised that the vaccine not be administered to adults, especially over
the age of thirty (Mr. Davis was thirty-nine), unless they fall into a high-risk
group. Id. While this warning was broadcast on the public news, a sales
representative of the manufacturer distributing vaccination information to the
immunization clinic which Mr. Davis used failed to provide any warnings
associated with the vaccine. Id. at 125. The sales representative, in fact,
represented the vaccine as entirely safe. Id.
69 Id. at 131.
Here, however, although the drug was denominated a prescription drug
it was not dispensed as such. It was dispensed to all comers at mass
clinics without an individualized balancing by a physician of the risks
involved. In such cases (as in the case of over-the-counter sales of
non-prescription drugs) warning by the manufacturer to its immediate
purchaser will not suffice.
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immunization setting. 70 The patient, moreover, did not rely on a
doctor's signature in order to get the vaccine. 7' Furthermore,
vaccines are typically given in large numbers where individuals do
not sit down with a physician one-on-one to hear the dangerous
side effects associated with its administration.72 Consequently, the
Court reasoned, manufacturers bear this responsibility and cannot
hide behind the shield of the learned intermediary doctrine.73
This exception was taken even further in Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories.74 In this case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that the manufacturer had a duty to warn
the consumer directly even when the vaccination occurs under the
supervision of a registered nurse and not in a mass immunization
setting.75 In congruence with Davis and Reyes, the majority of
jurisdictions within the United States recognize this mass immuni-
zation exception to the learned intermediary doctrine because
physicians do not weigh the risks and benefits of medications in a
clinic or mass immunization backdrop. 76 In cases where a physi-
70 Id.; see also supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text (discussing the
rationale behind the learned intermediary doctrine).
7' Davis, 399 F.2d at 131.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
71 Id. at 1277. In this case an eight-month old baby girl received the Sabin
polio vaccination, and after two weeks developed paralysis. Id. at 1269. Her
parents brought the suit against the manufacturer. Id. In comparing this case to
Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories the Court stated that "[w]hether [the] vaccine was
received by a nurse or pharmacist, it was, in both these cases, dispensed without
the sort of individualized medical balancing of the risks to the vaccinee that is
contemplated by the prescription drug exception." Id. at 1277.
76 See, e.g., Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1440 (8th Cir. 1983)
(concerning mass immunization for the flu); Givens v. Lederle Labs., 556 F.2d
1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977) (recognizing an exception even though the vaccine
was dispensed at a small physician's office); Allison v. Merck & Co., 878 P.2d
948, 959 (Nev. 1994) (holding that the learned intermediary rule did not apply
when the vaccination took place in a clinic even as a result of a physician's
referral); Kearl v. Lederle Labs., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 466-67 (finding the warning
given from manufacturer to vacinee adequate); Samuels v. American Cyanamid
Co., 495 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (recognizing an exception
for travel vaccines administered in a clinic). Cf Mazur v. Merck & Co., 964
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cian decides to vaccinate, however, most courts apply the learned
intermediary doctrine because the physician will properly weigh the
benefits and dangers.77
2. Contraceptives
Courts have been much more reluctant to recognize exceptions
to the learned intermediary doctrine in the case of contracep-
tives." Few jurisdictions, however, have allowed exceptions for
oral contraceptives. 79 In Odgers v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corpo-
F.2d 1348, 1361 (3d Cir. 1992) (upholding summary judgment for the defendant
manufacturer because the manufacturer had contractually delegated its duty to
warn to the Centers for Disease Control).
" See, e.g., Hurley v. Lederle Labs., 863 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding no exception to the learned intermediary doctrine when the vaccine was
administered in a physician's office by a nurse who fell under a physician's
supervision); Plummer v. Lederle Labs., 819 F.2d 349, 356-57 (2d Cir. 1987);
Schindler v. Lederle Labs., 725 F.2d 1036, 1039 (6th Cir. 1983); Stanback v.
Parke, Davis, & Co., 657 F.2d 642, 644 (4th Cir. 1981); Rohrbough v. Wyeth
Labs., 719 F. Supp. 470, 478 (N.D.W. Va. 1989); Tongate v. Wyeth Labs., 580
N.E.2d 1220, 1224-25 (I11. App. Ct. 1991); Dunn v. Lederle Labs., 328 N.W.2d
576, 579-80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
78 See, e.g., In re Norplant Contraceptive Prod. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 379
(5th Cir. 1999); Odom v. Searle & Co., 979 F.2d 1001, 1003 (4th Cir. 1992);
Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1980); MacPherson
v. Searle & Co., 775 F. Supp. 417, 422 (D.D.C. 1991); Reaves v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Zanzuri v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 748 F. Supp. 1511, 1514-15 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
748 F. Supp. 1142, 1147-48 (D. Or. 1989); Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705
F. Supp. 1024, 1031 (D.N.J. 1988); Kociemba v. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp.
1293, 1305-06 (D. Minn. 1988); Goodson v. Searle Labs., 471 F. Supp. 546,
548-49 (D. Conn. 1978); Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 381
(D. Md. 1975); West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 614 (Ark. 1991); Lacy
v. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398, 401 (Del. 1989); Martin v. Orhto Pharm. Corp.,
661 N.W.2d 352, 356-57(1996); Cobb v. Syntex Labs., 444 So. 2d 203, 205
(La. Ct. App. 1983); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 836-37 (Ohio
1981); McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21, 24 (Okla. 1982); Taurino v. Ellen, 579
A.2d 925, 935 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975,
978-79(1978).
'9 See infra notes 65-118 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have
created an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine for contraceptive
medications and devices).
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ration80 and Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Company,81 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan imposed
a duty on manufacturers of oral contraceptives to warn consumers
directly of side effects.82 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in
MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation8' has also
allowed the exception for oral contraceptives.' These courts have
distinguished oral contraceptives from therapeutic prescription
medications and have allowed for an exception to the learned
intermediary doctrine for several reasons. First, consumers of oral
contraceptives are typically healthy adults who themselves chose
a form of contraception from a variety of options.85 While
80 609 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985). The plaintiff in this case alleged that
use of oral contraceptives caused a clotting in her leg, which led to partial
paralysis. Id. at 868. The jury, which was instructed that the manufacturer had
a duty to warn the plaintiff directly, found in favor of the plaintiff. Id. A new
trial was granted on the grounds that the jury instructions were erroneous under
Michigan law. Id.
81 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich. 1985). The plaintiff in this case alleged that
her use of birth control pills manufactured by the defendant led her to suffer a
stroke. Id. at 380. The court denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, holding that it was for a jury to determine whether the manufacturer
had adequately warned the plaintiff. Id. at 381.
12 In these companion cases, the Eastern District of Michigan certified a
question to the Supreme Court of Michigan, asking whether the manufacturer of
oral contraceptives has a duty to warn consumers directly. See In re Certified
Question, 358 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1984). The majority of the Michigan Supreme
Court declined to answer the interrogatory, stating that the determination is one
for the legislature. Id. at 877-78. However, the district court chose to adopt the
rationale of the three dissenting judges, who felt that contraceptive manufacturers
should have a duty to warn consumers. See Odgers, 609 F. Supp. at 878;
Stephens, 602 F. Supp. at 830; see also In re Certified Question, 358 N.W.2d at
878-887 (dissenting opinion written by Boyle, J., and joined by Williams, C.J.,
and Brickley, J.).
83 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985).
4 Id. Plaintiff in this case suffered a stroke after taking Ortho Novum oral
contraceptives for three years. Id. at 67. A jury determined that the defendant
manufacturer was negligent because it failed to give plaintiff adequate warning
of the occurrence of blood clotting and stroke associated with its product. Id. at
68. The judge, however, granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. Id.
85 Odgers, 609 F. Supp. at 878 ("A woman obviously has a number of
467
468 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
dispersal does require a physician's prescription, consumers do not
depend on physicians to the same degree as they do for therapeutic
prescriptions.86 Contact between consumers and physicians is
minimal, typically only through annual examinations; thus,
consumers must monitor their own reactions to the product. 87
Furthermore, consumers are influenced in their choices by the
heavy marketing undertaken by the manufacturers. 88 Finally,
consumers receive all the necessary information and warnings from
options open as to methods of birth control. The more information the woman
is supplied with directly, the easier it is to ensure that an informed choice is
made among the available options."); In re Certified Question, 358 N.W.2d at
884 (Boyle, J., dissenting) ("Patient choice plays a much more prominent role
than in the case of drugs prescribed for the treatment of illness or injury. The
role of patient choice in this process supports the need for a direct patient
warning.").
86 See In re Certified Question, 358 N.W.2d at 884 (Boyle, J., dissenting).
Justice Boyle stated the following:
The physician makes no assessment of medical need. Rather, the
threshold question of need for contraception has already been decided
by the patient when she visits the physician .... These patients have
not traditionally received the information from their doctors concerning
the risks associated with the use of birth control pills as opposed to
other forms of contraception.
Id; see also Odgers, 609 F. Supp. at 878. The Odgers court reasoned:
[W]hen a woman takes an oral contraceptive as a means of birth
control supervision is minimal .... [T]he woman generally sees the
physician once a year, and even then, a visit is not necessarily required
when all that is needed is a refill-such prescriptions may be easily
telephoned in. Therefore ... there is little opportunity for the physician
to notice and avert any problems resulting from the use of the oral
contraceptive."
Id.
87 Odgers, 609 F. Supp. at 878.
88 In re Certified Question, 358 N.W.2d at 884 (Boyle, J. dissenting).
The marketing and resultant widespread use of oral contraceptives is
distinguishable from that of most other prescription drugs in several
respects. Consumer demand for the pill can be attributed in part to
zealous marketing by manufacturers. Publications extolling the wonders
of birth control pills have been addressed to the consumer public as
well as the medical profession.
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the FDA mandated inserts within the contraceptive packaging.89
As such, these courts have found an exception for oral contracep-
tives justified and even warranted.
Only one jurisdiction has extended this exception beyond oral
contraceptives to cover intrauterine devices ("IUDs"). 90 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit in Hill v.
Searle Laboratories - in adopting the reasoning set forth in
Ogders, Stephens, and MacDonald - distinguished all forms of
contraceptives from therapeutic prescription medications because
doctors typically do not make "intervening [or] individualized"
birth control decisions.9' Instead, the court recognized this as a
woman's "private and personal... decision that is often dependent
on factors to which the physician is not privy."92 These factors
include "effectiveness, convenience or cost, rather than medical
necessity. '93 In noting that IUDs and other types of birth control
are typically dispensed in clinic settings, the court did not consider
treating physicians as "intervening" parties.94 Thus, the court held
strict application of the learned intermediary doctrine unwarrant-
ed.95 This reasoning, however, has failed to convince the majority
to create an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine for any
method of contraception.96
89 See Odgers, 609 F. Supp. at 878-79.
9 Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff opted to have
a CU-7, a copper IUD, placed in her uterus by her physician. Id. at 1065-66. An
IUD is a small device placed in a woman's uterus that contains copper or a
hormone that prevents pregnancy for up to ten years. See Planned Parenthood@
Federation of America, Understanding IUDs, at http://www.plannedparenthood.-
org/bc/IUD.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2001). Approximately three years later, a
physician had to surgically remove the IUD, which had become implanted into
her small bowel. Id. The manufacturer conceded that it had not warned plaintiff
directly, and the physician could not recall if he had warned her of the dangers
associated with the CU-7, although he was aware of the risks. Id.
"' Hill, 884 F. Supp. at 1070-71.
92 Id. at 1071.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 id.
96 See infra note 78 (listing cases that have refused to create an exception).
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3. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
To date only one jurisdiction has recognized an exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine when the pharmaceutical manufactur-
er has engaged in DTC marketing.97 In its 1999 landmark decision
in Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
stepped into terra incognito by imposing a duty to directly and
adequately warn consumers if they chose to market their products
via a public medium.98 Several women brought suit against the
manufacturer of Norplant99 after they suffered pain and permanent
scarring from implantation and removal of the devices.' 0 Plain-
tiffs claimed that the manufacturer had engaged in an aggressive
advertising campaign since 1991 directed at women as opposed to
physicians, which influenced their decisions to choose Norplant as
their method of birth control.'0 1 They further alleged that Wyeth
Laboratories' advertisements on television and in magazines were
manipulative because they did not warn of side effects and only
presented the "simplicity and convenience" of Norplant use. 10 2
97 Perez v. Wyeth Labs., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999); see also Julie A.
Braun, Recent Developments in Medicine and Law, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 487,
548 (2000) (noting that Perez was the first case to recognize an exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine for DTC marketing).
" Perez, 734 A.2d at 1245.
99 Norplant is a reversible contraceptive composed of six, thin capsules,
which is surgically implanted in a woman's upper arm. Id. at 1247. The capsules
release a synthetic hormone continuously into a woman's bloodstream preventing
pregnancy for up to five years. Id. See also, Planned Parenthood® Federation of
America, Norplant and You, at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/bc/Norplant.-
htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2001).
'00 Id. Plaintiffs assert that Wyeth Laboratories knew that removal of the
system was painful and left scarring. Id. at 1247. They pointed to several medical
studies, which disclosed removal problems with 33% to 52% of women. Id.
Wyeth, however, failed to provide these warnings in their advertisements to
consumers. Id.
101 Id. Wyeth advertised Norplant directly to women via television
commercials and print ads in Mademoiselle, Glamour, and Cosmopolitan
magazines. Id.
102 Id. at 1247.
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The defendant, Wyeth Laboratories, 1°3 moved for summary
judgment arguing that under the learned intermediary doctrine and
the New Jersey Products Liability Act,' °4 it had no duty to warn
plaintiffs directly through advertisements.'0 5 The trial court
applied the learned intermediary doctrine and granted defendant's
motion because the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the manufac-
turer had failed to provide health care officials with adequate
warnings of side effects. 0 6 The appellate court affirmed.
10 7
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, reversed the
appellate court's decision.'0 8 In holding that the manufacturer of
Norplant Systems had a direct duty to warn plaintiff, the court
103 Wyeth Laboratories is the pharmaceutical manufacturer of Norplant and
is based in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Wyeth-Ayerst Pharmaceuticals, at
http://www.bioanalytical.com/calender/99/l0wyeth.htm (last visited Mar. 6,
2001). It is one of the four major companies that makes up Wyeth-Ayerst
Pharmaceuticals, the outfit responsible for innovating the first infant formula
patterned after a woman's breast milk, the first orally active estrogen, and the
first oral penicillin tablet. Id.
04 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (2000). The New Jersey Products Liability
Act provides:
An adequate product warning or instruction is one that a reasonably
prudent person in the same or similar circumstances would have
provided with respect to the danger and that communicates adequate
information on the dangers and safe use of the product, taking into
account the characteristics of, and the ordinary knowledge common to,
the persons by whom the product is intended to be used, or in the case
of prescription drugs, taking into account the characteristics of and
the ordinary knowledge common to, the prescribing physician. If the
warning or instruction given in connection with a drug or device or
food or food additive has been approved or prescribed by the federal
Food and Drug Administration under the "Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act," . . . a rebuttable presumption shall arise that the
warning or instruction is adequate.
Id. (emphasis added). The New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately argued that its
decision was in compliance with the legislative intent of this statute because "the
presumptive effect is in accordance" with the Act. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1259.
105 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1249.
'06 Id. at 1249.
107 See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., 713 A.2d 520 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998).
108 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1263-64.
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stated that "[d]irect advertising to consumers alters the calculus of
the learned intermediary doctrine."' 0 9 In picking away at the
basic assumptions behind the learned intermediary doctrine, the
majority found that, (1) in light of managed health care, fewer
patients are receiving warnings from their physicians, ° (2) the
advertisements themselves buttress the argument that consumers
now choose the prescription drugs they take,"' (3) the very
nature of DTC advertisements intrudes upon the traditional
physician-patient relationship because patients, now familiar with
prescription products in the market, ask doctors for specific
medications," 2 (4) DTC advertisements negate the argument that
dangers associated with drugs are too complex for patients to
comprehend," 3 and (5) manufacturers now have a number of
mediums to communicate effectively warnings to consumers. 14
Perez, however, is only a limited victory for consumers. The
court concluded that a pharmaceutical manufacturer has a duty to
warn patients directly and that "any duty to warn ... is presump-
tively met by compliance with federal labeling.""' 5 Under this
holding, a plaintiff will only succeed in a suit against advertising
'09 Id. at 1254.
10 Id. at 1255. "[B]ecause managed care has reduced the time allotted per
patient, physicians have considerably less time to inform patients of the risks and
benefits of a drug." Id. In fact, according to a 1997 F.D.A. survey only one-third
of patients claimed to have received side effect information from their doctors.
See infra notes 128-144 and accompanying text (discussing managed health care).
... Perez, 734 A.2d at 1256 ("[T]he fact that manufacturers are advertising
their drugs and devices to consumers suggests that consumers are active
participants in their health care decisions, invalidating the concept that it is the
doctor, not the patient, who decides whether a drug or device should be used.").
112 Id.
13 Id. ("Because the FDA requires that prescription drug and device
advertising carry warnings, the consumer may reasonably presume that the
advertiser guarantees the adequacy of its warnings.").
114 Id. These mediums include television, newspapers, magazines, the
Internet and others. Id.; see also notes 164-174 and accompanying text
(describing the regulations behind these mediums).
15 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1259 ("[A] rebuttable presumption that the duty to
consumers is met by compliance with FDA regulations helps to ensure that
manufacturers are not made guarantors against remotely possible, but not
scientifically-verifiable, side-effects of prescription drugs.").
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manufacturers if she can demonstrate that the manufacturer
deliberately failed to comply with FDA guidelines in its advertise-
ments.116 The FDA regulations serve as the threshold for manu-
facturers to escape liability and this exception to the learned
intermediary doctrine has limited advantages for plaintiffs.' 17 The
Court resolved, however, that this "approach harmonizes the
manufacturer's duty to doctors and to the public when it chooses to
directly advertise its products, and simultaneously recognizes the
public interest in informing patients about new pharmaceuti-
cals." ' 18 Such a compromise may be suitable in light of the
recent changes in the American health care system where DTC
advertisements more often than doctors increase consumers'
awareness of health issues.
II. THE CHANGING FACE OF HEALTH CARE AND THE BOOM OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUG ADVERTISEMENT
While the learned intermediary doctrine is still almost univer-
sally accepted, the health care system over the last two decades has
seen immense change, bringing into question the underlying
rationale behind the doctrine." 9 The shift to a system of managed
care has permanently changed the dynamics between physicians
and patients - for under this system a patient does not have the
limitless freedom to choose a physician, and a physician has far
less time to spend per patient. 2 ° With the recent, massive influx
116 Id. at 1259 ("For all practical purposes, absent deliberate concealment or
nondisclosure of after-acquired knowledge of harmful effects, compliance with
FDA standards should be virtually dispositive of such claims."); see also Dreier,
supra note 21, at 825 (placing such obstacles before a plaintiffs claim presents
a practically insurmountable burden).
117 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1259.
118 Id.
"9 See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text (outlining the rationale
behind the learned intermediary doctrine); see also Plant, supra note 14, at 1023
("Despite the courts' dogged adherence to the Learned Intermediary doctrine, the
reality of how patients receive prescription drug therapy in the United States
bears increasingly less resemblance to the courts' assumptions.").
120 See infra notes 122-44 and accompanying text (discussing the reformation
of health care).
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of DTC advertisements in magazines and newspapers and on the
television, radio, and Internet, patients have begun asking for and
receiving specific prescription products.' 2'
A. From the 1980s to 2001: The Development of Managed
Health Care
The American health care system has experienced major reform
over the last two decades. 22 In the 1980s and the decades prior,
fee-for-service plans 123 predominated the health care industry.
124
Under such plans, individuals or individuals' employers acquired
indemnity health insurance; 12 5 however, the insurers were indif-
ferent as to the physicians chosen by the individuals they cover-
ed. 126 The physician-patient relationship was thus maximized as
patients spent more one-on-one time with their chosen doctors, and
doctors were nearly autonomous in treating patients and prescribing
medications to them. 1
27
121 See infra notes 145-63 and accompanying text (discussing the boom of
DTC advertisements).
122 See infra notes 122-44 and accompanying text (discussing the reformation
of health care).
123 Fee-for-service plans are "per case basis" plans. See Neelam K. Sekhri,
Managed Care: The U.S. Experience, BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG., June 1,
2000, at 830. Under such a plan "[p]atients select health care providers [who
then] bill the private insurer or public payer" per patient visit. Id.
124 Id.; see also Rashi Fein, The Mechanics of Backlash: Changing
Perceptions, Changing Reality, J. HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L., Oct. 1999, at 985-
986 (noting that under a fee-for-service system, "in large measure insurers
behaved in a generally permissive manner, bowing to the behavior of physicians
whose judgements, presumably, were based solely on their views of what was
and what was not good medical practice").
125 See Sekhri, supra note 123, at 830 ("Under the traditional indemnity
insurance, the money follows the patient .... Most indemnity plans attempt to
limit demand through financial barriers to the patient, such as deductibles and co-
insurance rather than constraints on the provider.").
126 See Sekhri, supra note 123, at 830 ("This system of employer based,
indemnity insurance and fee-for-service health care conditioned both providers'
and patients' expectations of unlimited resources and unrestrained choice."); see
also Fein, supra note 124.
127 See David A. Balto, A Whole New World?: Pharmaceutical Responses
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Due to rising concerns in "care, cost, and coverage," reforma-
tion of America's health care system began in the late 1980s and
is still taking place today. 28 The emergence of managed care
organizations ("MCO"), '29which act as third-party payors, 130
brought with it the inclusion of monetary incentive arrangements
for providers to reduce costs M and has permanently altered the
to the Managed Care Revolution, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 83 (1997) (recognizing
that under fee-for-service care, doctors paid little attention to the costs of drugs
and infrequently offered generic substitutes); Plant, supra note 14, at 1023
(noting that under this traditional system of health care, physicians and patients
more often established extended relationships).
128 Mark A. Peterson, Introduction: Healthcare into the Next Century, J.
HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L., Apr. 1997 at 291, 301.
129 John K. Inglehart, Physicians and the Growth of Managed Care (Health
Policy Report), 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1167, 1167 (1994) ("Managed care refers
to a variety of methods of financing and organizing the delivery of comprehen-
sive health care in which an attempt is made to control costs by controlling the
provision of services."). MCOs include privately run health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) and preferred provider organizations (PPOs). See Peterson,
supra note 128, at 297. The government, through Medicare and Medicaid, also
provides managed care to the elderly, poor, and disabled. See Plant, supra note
14, at 1078 n.81. From 1992 to 1997, a third of all individuals receiving care
through private insurers moved over to MCOs. Kenneth E. Thorpe, Managed
Care as Victim or Villain?, J. HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L., Oct. 1999 at 949, 953.
By the year 2000, 86% of those receiving health benefits through employment
had a managed-care plan. Susan Brink, To Get Top Care, Get Pushy: If Your
Health Plan Won't Send You to a Leading Hospital, Seek Allies, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Jul. 17, 2000, at 62.
130 Third party payors are managed care organizations that physicians join
in return for payment. See Sekhri, supra note 123, at 830. "[P]roviders are paid
in a variety of ways. The physicians, as a group, may receive a capitated
payment, while individual physicians receive either a salary or a combination of
salary and incentive payment." See Sekhri, supra note 123, at 830.
131 Andrew B. Bindman, Primary Care Physicians' Experience of Financial
Incentives in Managed-Care Systems, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1516 (1998).
Managed-care organizations use a variety of strategies to influence the
practice styles of primary care physicians. One of the most controver-
sial of these methods is the use of financial incentives, particularly
incentives designed to encourage physicians to limit services, such as
referrals to specialists. Such incentives usually take the form of
bonuses paid over and above the physician's base income.
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dynamics between physicians and patients. 32 The key differences
between fee-for-service plans and MCOs are patient choice and
physician control.13 3 Under managed care, patients receiving
health insurance through employers or government programs must
choose a primary care physician from a limited list.134 Physicians,
reacting to the pressures of the managed care system, crowd more
patients into their schedules.135 As a result, they have less time
to develop a rapport with and gain the trust of their patients.
36
Further, they have diminished opportunities to properly diagnose a
patient, choose the most appropriate medication, and then adequate-
ly warn patients of the medication's dangers. 137  Moreover, under
managed health care, doctors have lost control over the medications
that they can prescribe.138 In an effort to control the high costs
of prescription medication, third-party payors often restrict a
doctor's choices through the use of formularies, 139 require a
132 See Thorpe, supra note 129, at 949 ("Surveys of physicians clearly report
their concern over the loss of clinical autonomy, a reduction in time spent with
patients, and slower growth in their income."); see also Fein, supra note 124, at
985 ("We are troubled by the fact that our physician, now an employee of an
HMO and subject to its rules and regulations, seems busier and more rushed.").
.33 Catherine McLaughlin, The Who, What, and How of Managed Care, J.
HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L., Oct. 1999, at 1047 ("[T]he management of physician
practice is at the heart of managed care plans .... In some studies of managed
care, the focus is not on the management of physicians and their practices, but
rather on the control of consumers and their utilization of physician services.");
see also Fein, supra note 124, at 987 (feeling that public has become mad over
its inability to freely choose physicians).
"' See McLaughlin, supra note 133, at 1047.
135 See Bindman, supra note 131, at 1516. Of 776 primary care physicians
working in managed health care surveyed, 75% felt pressure to see more patients
per day. Bindman, supra note 131.
136 See Sana Loue, An Epidemiological Framework for the Formulation of
Health Insurance Policy, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 523, 530 (1993) (noting that
patients, stripped of direct physician contact, feel less able to develop long-term
relationships with particular doctors).
137 id.
138 See Balto, supra note 127, at 83 (explaining how physicians have less
control over their prescriptions due to the impact of managed care on the
pharmaceutical industry).
139 See Plant, supra note 14, at 1078 n.89. A formulary is a catalogue of
prescription drugs that doctors can choose from. See Plant, supra note 14.
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doctor to prescribe generic drugs, 4 ' and/or offer monetary
bonuses for doctors who choose less expensive drugs. 141 Managed
care organizations, private insurers, and government programs are
more frequently hiring pharmacy benefit managers ("PBM") to
procure bulk, discounted supplies of prescription drugs from
pharmaceutical manufacturers. 142 Many pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers, in turn, buy out PBMs or contract with them in order to secure
their products' place in the market. 4 3 Consequently, under a
Usually, physicians will have to make a special request to prescribe a drug not
on the formulary, and the MCO will discourage the physician from so doing. See
Plant, supra note 14.
140 See Balto, supra note 127, at 83 ("[G]eneric substitution has increased
from approximately 20% to 40% of new prescriptions, and generics have become
a far more significant force in the market, leading to lower prices for consum-
ers."); Henry Grabowski, Health Reform: A Pharmaceutical Innovation, 24
SETON HALL L. REV. 1221, 1224 (1994) (noting the increase of generic drugs
on formularies and describing the incentive programs offered to doctors to
prescribe them over the more expensive brand names).
141 Plant, supra note 14, at 1026 n.93.
[P]hysicians are promised a monetary bonus if they prescribe drugs in
such a way as to save money. Doctors are encouraged to use drug
classes intrinsically less expensive than others, to maximize the use of
generic products, and perhaps delay or even avoid the use of medica-
tions for certain conditions.
Plant, supra note 14, at 1026 n.93.
142 See Balto, supra note 127, at 83-84.
PBMs typically select participating pharmacists and drug manufacturers
and suppliers, create and administer a point-of-scale claims processing
system, negotiate quantity discounts with pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers, administer the record keeping and payment systems of the plans,
and maintain quality control. A PBM typically acts as the agent for the
plan sponsor to influence product selection-encourage generic and
therapeutic substitution based on negotiated prices with manufacturers.
Balto, supra note 127, at 84.
143 See Balto, supra note 127, at 84. The Federal Trade Commission
monitors these acquisitions between pharmaceutical manufacturers and PBMs
very closely due to potential antitrust abuses. Balto, supra note 127, at 85. The
Commission typically requires PBMs to use open formularies that include a
number of drugs from various manufacturers so that the acquiring manufacturer
will not monopolize the formulary with its own products. Balto, supra note 127,
at 85.
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managed care system, the manufacturers have arguably gained a
good portion of the control physicians have lost in putting
prescription drugs in the hands of consumers.'" This system may
provide, in part, an explanation for the boom in direct-to-consumer
prescription drug advertisements.
B. The Boom of Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug
Advertisements
In light of such widespread health care changes, the pharmaceu-
tical industry has expanded its marketing to consumers.145 With
patients now playing a larger role in their health care decisions,
manufacturers have found that familiarizing consumers to prescrip-
tion pharmaceuticals has led to profound increases in their profit
margins. 4 6 Consumers exposed to print, television, and radio
advertisements and Internet web sites are more likely to ask their
doctors for specific brands of prescription drugs.'4 7 Doctors, out
of fear of losing patients and/or due to less time spent per patient,
are more inclined to grant patients' requests.1 48 Hence, manufac-
'44 Balto, supra note 127, at 85.
145 See infra notes 122-44 and accompanying text (providing information
about the recent changes in health care).
146 Nancy Chockley, Selling Doctors on What to Prescribe, USA TODAY,
Dec. 22, 1999, at 19A ("It's more than a coincidence that 22% of the $43-billion
increase in prescription-drug sales came from the 10 drugs most heavily
advertised to consumers."); Robert A. Rosenblatt, Drug Firms' TV Ads Fuel Rise
in Costs and Demand, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 26, 1999, at Al ("Americans spent
$100 billion for prescription drugs in 1998, an 84% increase in five years.").
147 Michael Kirsch, Even if They're Too Slick and Manipulative, Drug Ads
Are Useful, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 8, 2000, at I1B. Mr. Kirsch, an advocate of
DTC advertising, analogizes the marketing of prescription drugs to patients to the
marketing of toys and cereals to children. Id. Children cannot go out and
purchase these products alone as patients cannot purchase drugs without a
prescription. Id. Children, however, can certainly influence their parents'
purchases by pleading for the marketed product. Id. Likewise, patients can
influence the prescriptions they receive by pushing a brand on the prescribing
physician. Id.
148 See Rosenblatt, supra note 146, at Al. Mr. Rosenblatt quotes a Salt Lake
City physician, Dr. John C. Nelson, who states, "When the patient says 'Give
me something, give me something,' physicians often acquiesce because they are
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turers have begun inundating consumers with more advertise-
ments. 1
49
Before the 1990s, DTC prescription drug advertisements were
relatively rare. 50 In 1982, after physicians working for the FDA
deemed the first two DTC advertisements inappropriate out of fear
that consumers would be misled and confused,'51 the FDA
requested that all pharmaceutical manufacturers abstain from
advertising in order to allow for a proper assessment of the societal
implications of DTC marketing.1 52 In 1989, after the FDA lifted
the voluntary moratorium, money spent on DTC print advertise-
ments rose from nearly zero to almost $12 million per annum. 53
The FDA spent the early 1990s trying to figure out how best to
regulate DTC advertisements, 54 and the amount of prescription
drug marketing increased steadily. 155 For example, in 1991
manufacturers spent over $55 million in prescription drug market-
ing. 156 By 1996, this amount increased to $600 million.'57 In
afraid they may end up losing the patient." Rosenblatt, supra note 146, at Al.
"'9 See infra notes 150-63 and accompanying text (providing overview of the
exponential growth of DTC marketing).
50 Rosenblatt, supra note 146, at Al (noting that advertisements prior to the
1990s boom were focused towards the medical community and could be found
almost entirely in medical journals or other specialized publications).
51 Wayne L. Pines, A History and Perspective on Direct-to-Consumer
Promotion, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 489, 491 (1999). One of the products
advertised was Rufen®, an ibuprofin manufactured by Boots Pharmaceuticals,
a British company, and the other was Pneumovax®, a pneumonia vaccination
manufactured by Merck, Sharpe & Dohme. Id. The existing FDA guidelines were
geared primarily towards advertisements for doctors, and the FDA was unsure
of how to regulate marketing directly to consumers. Id.
152 Id.
I d. at 493.
Is d. Most of the advertising was in print although some ads were
broadcast on cable channels. Id. The FDA guidelines during these years limited
the advertisements from being product-specific, but required interested consumers
to consult their physicians. Id. at 494. For example, Upjohn released commercials
promoting hair growth in men without specifically mentioning their product,
Rogaine®. Id.
"' Id. at 496.
156 Id.
157 id.
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August of 1997 the FDA relaxed its guidelines for product-specific
television and radio ads. 5 8 Consequently, DTC marketing has
grown exponentially with pharmaceutical manufacturers spending
almost $1.9 billion on DTC advertisements in 1999, more than
triple what they spent in 1996. '59Furthermore, a comparison
between the first four months of 2000 and the first four months of
1999 shows a 58% increase in spending by pharmaceutical
manufacturers on DTC advertisements. 60 Today, one can hardly
turn on the television or radio or open a magazine or newspaper
without confronting advertisements for prescription medications
offering to clear seasonal allergies,' 6 1 promote hair growth,
62
ease cancer symptoms, alleviate sexual dysfunction, reduce high
158 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2000); see also infra notes 164-74 (providing
overview of the FDA regulations).
159 Carol M. Ostrom, Lower Drug Prices in Canada a Prescription for
Outrage in the U.S.: Are We Being Soaked Because U.S. Lacks Price Control,
or Are the Charges Necessary to Keep Research Robust?, THE SEATTLE TIMES,
Sept. 5, 2000, at Al. The money spent by pharmaceutical manufacturers now
rivals and has surpassed that spent by Coca-Cola and other large companies. Id.;
see also Susan Okie, With TV Spots, Drug Firms Aim at Patients' Role; Strategy
for Prescriptions Shifts Away From Doctors, THE WASH. POST, May 22, 2000,
at A01 (noting that nearly 60% of money spent on DTC ads went towards
television commercials, "the fastest-growing medium for advertising prescription
medications").
160 DTC Drug Ads Up 58 Percent, But Recall Doesn't Match Spend Level,
MED., MARKETING & MEDIA, Sept. 1, 2000, at 6.
161 See Francesca Lunzer Kritz, Ask Your Doctor About... ; Which of the
Many Advertised Allergy Drugs Are Right for You?, WASH. POST, June 6, 1000,
at Z09. The advertising for antihistamines, or allergy medications, comprised
three-fourths of all prescription drug advertisements in 1999. Id. Claritin® has
become the top-selling allergy medicine and the eighth overall best selling
medicine through advertisements, with 1999 sales surpassing $1.5 billion. Id.
162 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorism Seriously:
Some Efforts of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1420, 1456 (1999).
Rogaine®, manufactured by Upjohn and now available over-the-counter, was the
first prescription drug advertised through television commercials. Id. The
advertisements were geared to convince balding men that Rogaine could prevent
hair loss and promote hair growth, which would boost job performance and
enhance their sexual appeal. Id.
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blood pressure and cholesterol, prevent heart attacks, or relieve
insomnia.
63
C. FDA Regulations: T, Radio, and Print Ads
The FDA guidelines, under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA),' 6 require all prescription drug advertisements to include
the "side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness" of promoted
products.165 The regulations for presenting such information,
however, are different for print ads in magazines and newspapers
and broadcast ads on radio and television. 166 Print advertisements
require the insertion of a "brief summary" that includes all the side
effects and contraindications associated with the prescription
medication. 67 This term "brief summary," however, is a "misno-
mer considering that the summary is anything but brief."'168 An
abundance of data is often squeezed in fine print on the back page
of the advertisement. 169
163 See Darryl E. Owens, RX-Rated Diagnosis; From Allergies to Love Life,
Are TV Drug Ads Creating a Nation of Savvy Patients or a Bunch of Worry-
warts?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 18, 2000, at El.
'64 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (2000).
165 Id. § 352(n)(3); see also 21 C.F.R. § 202(c)(3)(i) (2000).
166 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (e) (2000).
167 id.
168 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1258.
169 Id. While the front page or two-page spread of an advertisement often
presents colorful pictures of smiling people, the back page is crowded with
information presented in small, difficult to read print. See Advertisement for
Claritin®, REDBOOK, Oct. 2000, at 54-56 (offering to alleviate seasonal
allergies); Advertisement for Flonase®, REDBOOK, Oct. 2000, at 131-32 (offering
to help clear up nasal allergies); Advertisement for Paxil®, REDBOOK, Oct. 2000,
at 59-60 (offering to mitigate the symptoms of social anxiety disorder);
Advertisement for Singulair®, REDBOOK, Oct. 2000, at 145-46 (offering to help
control asthma); Advertisement for Zithromax®, REDBOOK, Oct. 2000, at 216-
218 (offering to cure children's ear infections); Advertisement for Prevnar®,
GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Sept. 2000, at 55-57 (offering a child's immunization that
helps reduce the risk of bacterial meningitis); Advertisement for Renova®, GOOD
HOUSEKEEPING, Sept. 2000, at 39-41 (offering to reduce wrinkles); Advertise-
ment for Viagra®, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Sept. 2000, at 77-78 (offering to cure
erectile dysfunction); Advertisement for Visudyne®, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Sept.
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Broadcast advertisements, on the other hand, do not include
brief summaries, as their format does not permit such extensive
disclosure. 70  Rather, prescription drug manufacturers must
include a "major statement" of risks that is balanced with its
promotion of the drug's benefits.' 7' Because a brief summary is
not included, the manufacturer must make an "adequate provision
for the dissemination of the approved package labeling in connec-
tion with the broadcast presentation."' 7 2 This includes directing
consumers to such information by presenting a toll-free telephone
number, an Internet web site, a printed advertisement, and by
2000, at 99-100 (offering to reduce symptoms of age-related muscular
degeneration, the leading cause of blindness in people over the age of fifty). The
details on the back page of these advertisements include information about usage,
dosage and administration, contraindications, warnings, precautions, and adverse
reactions. See Advertisement for Claritin®, REDBOOK, Oct. 2000, at 54-56. The
print is extremely difficult to read on several of the advertisements, not only
because the font used is tiny but because the spaces between lines of text have
been reduced to crowd in more information. See Advertisement for Zithromax®,
REDBOOK, Oct. 2000, at 216-18 (providing barely legible script in the brief
summary). Some of these brief summaries also contain medical terminology that
the average lay person would not ordinarily understand. For example, Pfizer used
words like "angioedema," "nephritis," "cholestatic jaundice," "dypspepsia," and
"monolia" in its advertisement for Zithromax in the Oct. 2000 edition of
Redbook. Some advertisements, on the other hand, include understandable
descriptions of side effects, warnings, and precautions. For example Merck's
advertisements for Singulair@ in the Oct. 2000 edition of Redbook used terms
and phrases like "bad/vivid dreams, ..... a flu-like illness," "a feeling of pins and
needles or numbness of arms and legs," and "abdominal (stomach) pain."
Advertisement for Singulair®, REDBOOK, Oct. 2000, at 145-46.
170 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (2000).
Advertisements broadcast through media such as radio, television, or
telephone communications systems shall include information relating
to the major side effects and contraindications of the advertised drugs
in the audio or audio and visual parts of the presentation and unless
adequate provision is made for dissemination of the approved or
permitted package labeling in connection with the broadcast presenta-
tion shall contain a brief summary of all necessary information related
to the side effects and contraindications.
Id.
171 id.
172 Id.
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requesting that consumers see their physician. 7 3 The FDA,
however, has not yet determined how best to regulate the wealth of
information pharmaceutical manufacturers are providing consumers
over the Internet.
74
D. The Internet
Currently, approximately 48% of consumers receive information
from the over two million Internet web sites offering health care
information. 175 The Internet has been touted "the most economi-
cal and powerful means of mass promotion yet created"'176 be-
cause it has enabled the pharmaceutical industry to reach consum-
ers across the globe with product promotions and information.
177
Despite the limitless amount of health care information the
Internet can provide, 178 the FDA has not yet established guide-
173 See Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed Broadcasting Advertise-
ments, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/index.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2001).
174 See infra note 178-84 and accompanying text (discussing the FDA's
confusion over how best to regulate the prescription drug information provided
over the Internet).
171 The Doctor is in ... the Internet, GROCERY HEADQUARTERS, Aug. 1,
2000, at 62 [hereinafter The Doctor].
176 See Emile L. Loza, Note, FDA Regulations of Internet Pharmaceutical
Communications: Strategies for Improvement, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 269, 270
(2000).
The Internet is the most economical and powerful means of mass
promotion yet created. Around the clock, the Internet reaches markets
virtually around the world. Internet investment is miniscule when
compared with the likely returns on such a worldwide marketing
presence. These economies of scale are attractive to manufacturers as
they seek to maximize returns on their enormous outlays in bringing
a new drug into the market.
Id. at 272.
177 Marilyn A. Moberg, et at., Surfing the Net in Shallow Waters: Product
Liability Concerns and Advertising on the Internet, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 213,
217 (1998) ("The Internet... provides access to an almost unlimited amount of
information.").
178 See Alan N. Sutin & Ellen Goldberg, Is the Internet Safe for Consum-
ers?, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 27, 2000, at S9 ( "[Tihe Internet is by its very nature
inherently borderless. For the first time in history, there is an efficient channel
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lines or restrictions tailored for this medium. 7 9 The Internet
poses unique challenges to FDA regulators. 8 ° First, the FDA has
not decided the central issue of whether Internet sites constitute
labeling or advertising. 8 ' Both methods of disseminating product
information - labeling and advertising - fall under different FDA
regulations. 82 The FDA has allowed the manufacturers to deter-
of distribution that permits even the smallest of businesses to reach the global
market.").
179 See P. Terrance Gaffney, N.J. High Court Scuttles Learned Intermediary
Rule, NAT'L L.J., May 22, 2000, at B 11 (observing that "the FDA has not issued
any specific guidance on DTC advertising and the Internet"); Loza, supra, note
176, at 269 (criticizing the FDA for failing to establish regulations over the
Internet); Moberg, supra, note 177, at 213.
180 See Gaffney, supra note 179, at B 11.
In fairness to the FDA, regulating the Internet is not a simple task, and
the Internet raises a plethora of regulatory nightmares. For example,
what types of links can a company provide, and does that company
have a duty to monitor those links to ensure that off-label (promoting
of a drug for purposes other than it was originally approved) is not
occuring? If a U.S. resident contacts the site for information about a
company product not approved for sale in the United States, what
information may the company provide?
In an instance in which a visitor to a Web site informs the drug
company via e-mail that he or she is using that company's product for
a nonapproved indication and is seeking additional testing information,
does that company have a duty to warn the consumer about a
nonapproved use? If so, what information should be provided? What
about chat rooms and news groups? Where would these ubiquitous
forums fall in the FDA's regulatory scheme? These questions are not
easily answered, but nonetheless need to be addressed.
Gaffney, supra note 179, at B 11.
181 See Loza, supra note 176, at 274 ("[The] FDA states that the require-
ments are essentially the same regardless of the classification, but does not
indicate which regulations control Internet communication.").
82 The FDA's labeling and advertising requirements are set forth in 21
C.F.R. §§ 201, 202 (2000). The term "labeling" refers to "written, printed, or
graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2)
accompanying such article." 21 U.S.C § 321(m) (2000). The manufacturer must
fully disclose all side effects and contraindications associated with the prescrip-
tion medication. See Moberg, supra note 177, at 216. The FDA considers
DIRECT TO CONSUMER ADVERTISEMENTS
mine which regulation to follow, 183and the manufacturers have
more often observed the FDA guidelines for labeling as those
guidelines require full disclosure of side effects and contraindica-
tions, affording manufacturers the most legal protection.'84
Regardless, the pharmaceutical companies do not have any control
over much of the on-line information as other individuals and
organizations are free to put out information on their product
through web sites and chat rooms. 185 As a result, the health care
industry has expressed growing concern that misinformation will
fall into the hands of consumers. 186 This concern is justifiable,
especially now that consumers spend less time with their doc-
tors187 and are even able to obtain drugs without prescriptions
labeling to include any written or oral data that explains the drug even if it does
not accompany the product. 21 C.F.R. § 201.1 (2000). Labeling statements must
meet approval by the FDA or else the product will be "misbranded." Id. The
FDA requires under its advertising guidelines only that the manufacturer provide
a balanced statement disclosing major side effects and contraindications. 21
C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(1) (2000); see also supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text
(discussing FDA guidelines for DTC advertising).
183 See Gaffney, supra note 179, at Bll.
If the lack of formal guidance were not troublesome enough, the FDA
has given off a number of conflicting signals, leaving promoters to
guess where it will come down on Web site content. An FDA official
in the Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising and Communications
commented "For now, we're letting drug companies choose whatever
category of current regulations they think best fits their presence on the
Internet."
Gaffney, supra note 179, at B11.
184 Manufacturers likely choose to follow the labeling guidelines versus the
advertisement guidelines because labeling guidelines are far more comprehensive
in requiring detailed information on all side effects and contraindications. See
supra note 182 (describing the distinctions between labeling and advertising); see
also Loza, supra note 176, at 274 ("Manufacturers, however, likely regard a
labeling classification as key to their learned intermediary defense.").
185 See Healthcare Grows Consumer Appeal, MARKETING, May 25, 2000
("Ludicrously, anyone can launch a web site describing what a pharmaceutical
product does.").
186 See The Doctor, supra note 175, at 62.
187 See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (discussing the changes
in physician-patient relationships due to the evolving health care system).
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through on-line pharmacies.'88 The FDA has issued a number of
warnings to consumers to beware of false information and web
sites offering prescription medications; 89 however, they should
do more to ensure consumer safety.' 90
188 See Amy J. Oliver, Internet Pharmacies: Regulation of a Growing
Industry, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 98 (2000) (noting that pharmaceutical
companies, most of which are non-U.S. based, dispensing prescription
medications without requiring a prescription are of questionable reputation and
often do not provide any warnings of side effects). A number of on-line
pharmacies doling out prescription drugs will require the on-line patient to fill
out a health form that will be evaluated by an on-line "doctor" before the
prescription approval. See, e.g., 4 Health Drugs, Buy Viagra, Meridia, Paxil,
Xenical, Propencia, Zyban Online!, at http://www.4-health-drugs.com/ (last
visited Feb. 17, 2001) (requiring on-line consumers to disclaim any legal rights
in authorizing "4 Health Drugs, LLC and any physicians, associates or assistants
of its choice to perform and undertake an on-line medical consultation and
evaluation of [the consumer] as a potential patient and to treat [the consumer].").
There is, however, much room for abuse. Other on-line pharmacies offering
drugs from foreign countries require no health information from the on-line
patient. See, e.g., Drugquest, at http://www.drugquest.com/ (last visited Feb. 17,
2001) (advertising that anyone can "purchase any prescription drug legally
without a prescription" from countries like Mexico, Spain, Thailand, India, etc.
for a membership fee of $64.95, and 75% off U.S. costs).
89 See United States Dep't of Health and Human Services: Food and Drug
Administration, at http:// www.fda.gov/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2000). The FDA's
web site provides consumers with warnings on how to safeguard against "rogue
[pharmaceutical] sites." Id. at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2000/l00-
online.html. The Clinton-Gore administration placed $10 million into the fiscal
year 2001 budget to help the FDA respond to such Internet sites that threaten the
health of consumers that allow them to obtain prescription medications without
the prescription. See White House Office of the Press Secretary, Clinton
Administration Unveils New Initiative to Protect Consumers Buying Prescription
Drug Products Over the Internet, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/buyonline/online-
salespr.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2000).
190 See Loza, supra note 176, at 269.
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III. THE SOCIETAL VALUE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG
ADVERTISEMENTS: THE CHOICES COURTS FACE IN A
SOCIETY IN WHICH THE CONSUMER IS BECOMING THE
LEARNED
Such an influx of DTC prescription drug information through
advertisements and the Internet has both beneficial and harmful
effects on society. A court considering whether to create an
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine for DTC advertise-
ments should first consider these benefits and risks and should
weigh the societal ramifications of its decision on consumers and
on the health and pharmaceutical industries. Even if a court finds
an exception warranted, as the New Jersey Supreme Court did, 91
it may still use the FDA guidelines as a measure of protection
against a pharmaceutical manufacturer's liability exposure.
The four options outlined below take into account the societal
value a court chooses to place on DTC advertisements.1 92 In
doing so, this Note concludes that the third option presents the
optimal solution for courts. Under this option, courts recognize an
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine, but require plaintiffs
to rebut a presumption that the defendant manufacturer has
complied with the FDA regulations. 93 With the FDA guidelines
as a shield, pharmaceutical manufacturers will not be discouraged
from advertising, moreover, they will also have incentive to comply
with existing regulations. 94 As a result, the harmful effects of
DTC marketing will be reduced, while the consumers will remain
informed.
19' Perez, 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999); see also supra notes 97-117
(discussing Perez).
192 See infra notes 230-68 and accompanying text (outlining the four
options).
193 See infra notes 250-57 and accompanying text (detailing this option).
'94 See infra notes 269-71 and accompanying text (discussing the implica-
tions of courts choosing the third option).
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A. The Societal Benefits and Harms of DTC Advertising
Advocates of DTC prescription drug advertisements argue that
these advertisements produce better-educated and informed patients
and encourage treatment of physical and mental ailments. 95
Undoubtedly the pharmaceutical manufacturers argue that their
advertisements raise consumer awareness by educating them on
various health problems and corresponding drug treatments. 9 6 A
spokesman from Schering-Plough, the maker of top-selling
Claritin®,9 7 stated that "[w]e believe advertising can play a key
role in informing the public of drug advances."' 98 As a result of
better education, the manufacturers intend for patients to become
more involved in personal health care decisions.' 99 The evidence
'9' See, e.g., Ostrom, supra note 159, at Al (noting the pharmaceutical
manufacturers' arguments in favor of DTC marketing); Media Drives Public
Drug Awareness, CHEMIST & DRUGGIST, June 24, 2000, at 6 ("Television is best
at creating awareness of new drugs."); Laura Newman, Avalanche of Direct-to-
Consumer Drug Marketing Brings New Questions, 92 J. NAT'L CANCER INST.
964 (2000) (quoting the director of the FDA's Drug Marketing, Advertising, and
Communications division, who stated that the "advertising can serve an
educational function, educa[ting] the public about diseases that they were not
aware of"); Okie, supra note 159, at Al ("Advocates say [that] the ads alert
people to new treatments and open up discussion of the once-forbidden topics
such as impotence or depression."); Owens, supra note 163, at El ("Drug-makers
say the ads educate consumers about disease and treatment, empower patients to
become more involved in their health and encourage better compliance with
prescriptions."); Rosenblatt, supra note 146, at Al (quoting advocates of DTC
ads who feel that the ads raise awareness and reduce stigmas of certain diseases).
196 Pamela L. Moore, An Overdose of Drug Advertising?, BUSINESS WEEK,
May 22, 2000, at 52 (noting that "[p]harmaceutical companies say their ads
prompt people to seek life-saving treatment"). A lobbyist for the pharmaceutical
companies, Meredith Art, claims that the advertisements "empowers patients"
who want information. See Ostrom, supra note 159, at Al.
197 Claritin® is one of the most heavily advertised prescription drug
advertisements. See Kritz, supra note 161, at Z09. As a result, it has been the top
selling prescription medication for seasonal allergies and the eighth best selling
drug in the United States. See Kritz, supra note 161, at Z09.
'98 See Moore, supra note 196, at Al.
'99 See Owens, supra note 163, at El.
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indicates that the advertisements in fact help achieve that goal.200
In a recent magazine survey, 76% of respondents believed that
DTC advertisements helped them to become more involved in their
own health care.2"' As more people are requesting specific drugs
from their physicians, these advertisements are turning passive
patients into engaged consumers.2 2 Engaged consumers who take
an active role in their health care are more likely to actively seek
out additional information and make informed decisions regarding
drug choices.2 3
Moreover, the advertisements increase awareness of physical
and mental diseases and ailments and eliminate stigmas often
associated with certain conditions.2°4 For example, a person
200 See Owens, supra note 163, at El. This article reported that, of the over
175 million people exposed to DTC advertisements, 55 million spoke directly to
their physicians about the advertisements and 15 million actually requested an
advertised drug. See Owens, supra note 163, at El.
201 See Rx Video PR Soars; Sparks Concern Among Physicians, O'DWYER'S
PR SERVICES REPORT, Apr., 2000, at 1 [hereinafter Rx Video] (discussing results
of survey).
202 See Id. Some studies may suggest, however, that the advertising
pharmaceutical companies do not do an adequate job of conveying side effect
risks; thus, consumers are not properly being informed. Charlotte E. Sibley, Can't
We Get Better DTC Advertising Research?, MED., MARKETING & MEDIA, Feb.
1, 2000, at 96. The author of this article conducted a survey finding that 81% of
respondents reported seeing DTC advertisements, but only roughly 20% found
the advertisements to be clear and understandable, while a mere 10% felt the
pharmaceutical companies were doing an adequate job of presenting side effect
information. Id. One further survey found that roughly half of consumers
surveyed believed that DTC advertisements play a useful role in society. Michael
F. Conlan, Consumers Speak Out, DRUG Topics, Mar. 20, 2000, at 71
[hereinafter Conlan, Consumers].
203 See Michael F. Conlan, In-Your-Face Pharmacy: Will the Boom in Rx
Ads Aimed at Consumers Continue?, DRUG TOPics, July 8, 1996, at 92 ("A
properly educated, properly motivated patient-partner is the best bet the physician
has for getting a good outcome for the patient overall .... and [a]nd direct-to-
consumer ads play a part in that.").
204 See Michael C. Allen, Medicine Goes Madison Avenue: An Evaluation
of the Effect of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising on the Learned Intermediary
Doctrine, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 113, 128 (1997).
An analysis of the potential benefits of the direct-to-consumer
pharmaceutical advertising indicates that such advertising can often be
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affected by mental depression might recognize personal symptoms
in an advertisement for Prozac®2 5 and might finally muster the
courage to see a doctor.206 Furthermore, many impotent men
likely suffered in shame and silence before former Senator Bob
Dole encouraged treatment through Pfizer's Viagra®. 2 7  A
number of health care officials and consumers alike have voiced
opinions that these advertisements serve a valuable purpose by
giving recognition to genuine, treatable health problems - health
the first source of information on newly available treatments. Consum-
er advertising may also increase awareness of established treatments
and procedures. An example of the educational benefits of consumer
advertising is the ability to trigger consumer recognition of symptoms
of various illnesses and diseases. Specific examples might include
information on symptoms such as excessive thirst as a potential
warning sign of diabetes and unexplained weight loss and insomnia as
potential indicators of depression.
Direct-to-consumer advertisements may also encourage consumers who
may have previously discontinued treatment due to side effects to
consult the appropriate health professional concerning new treatment
alternatives. For example, many commonly prescribed anti-hypertensive
medications may cause impotence in male patients often resulting in
patient self-termination of treatment. Information on the availability of
potential alternative medications with a lower incidence of side effects
may encourage such patients to seek additional treatment.
Id.
205 Advertisement for Prozac®, LADIES HOME JOURNAL, Oct. 2000, at 65-67
(offering to help ease symptoms of depression).
206 See Rosenblatt, supra note 146, at Al.
[An] under-treated group motivated by adverting is the population
suffering from depression. Many are embarrassed or afraid to seek
help. "There has been a stigma about depression," said Mary Graham,
vice president of the National Mental Health Assn., an advocacy group.
"Advertising gets consumers talking to physicians and seeking help."
Rosenblatt, supra note 146, at Al.
207 Advertisement for Viagra®, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Sept. 2000, at 77-78
(offering to cure erectile dysfunction); see also Rosenblatt, supra note 146, at
Al.
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problems that sufferers should not be ashamed to admit they
have. 8
Opponents, including consumer groups and health care officials,
feel that DTC prescription drug advertisements serve little use to
consumers and health care officials. 20 9 Their arguments against
DTC advertisements are threefold. First, some believe that such ads
are merely manipulative marketing schemes that increase pharma-
ceutical manufacturers' profit margins and mislead consumers with
false promises.1 ° Second, some feel that patients are not capable
of fully understanding the highly technical information provided in
a brief summary and, as a result, sometimes receive the wrong
medications. 21 ' Finally, a number of opponents believe that such
extensive advertising drives up the costs of already pricey prescrip-
tion drugs.212
By not providing an equal and accurate balance of benefits and
risks, a number of DTC advertising critics feel that prescription
drug marketing creates "misdirected expectations and desires. 213
The pharmaceutical industry is driven by profit, and not public
education; thus, manufacturers will overplay benefits and create an
208 See Rosenblatt, supra note 146, at Al; see also Conlan, Consumers,
supra note 202, at 71 (reporting that over half of consumers surveyed found the
DTC ads to be useful and easy to understand).
209 See, e.g., Owens, supra note 163, at El (noting that consumer groups and
health care officials have voiced opposition to DTC advertising). Cf Michael F.
Conlan, Who Will Land Your Vote? R.Ph. Panel Casts Its Vote for President and
Some of the Controversial Issues Facing the Country, DRUG TOPICS, Oct. 16,
2000, at 50.
Two-thirds of the R.Ph.s [pharmacists] do not think direct-to-consumer
advertising of prescription drugs is good for consumers, mostly
because they believe patients pressure doctors to prescribe. "I like that
it's educating consumers," said an Illinois chain R.Ph. "But, since we
are a nation of sheep, I am uncomfortable with the concept of a patient
demanding a med from his M.D. simply because it was on TV. It's sort
of like children and the latest toy." A Pennsylvania chain R.Ph. said
DTC ads were "bad for hypochondriacs."
Id.
210 See infra notes 213-18 and accompanying text (detailing criticisms).
211 See infra notes 219-23 and accompanying text (detailing criticisms).
212 See infra notes 224-27 and accompanying text (detailing criticisms).
213 See Owens, supra note 163, at El.
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unrealistic, "cure-all" mentality in consumers' minds.214 In a study
analyzing over 320 DTC advertisements, researchers found that
"DTC ads tended to play up positive features of a drug and
downplay the negative and unknown aspects. 2 15 Consumers,
however, view these advertisements as credible and reliable.1 6 In
a 1999 telephone survey of over 2000 consumers, 62% classified
the ads as "trustworthy. ' 217 Yet the FDA has had to reprimand
pharmaceutical companies a number of times for deceiving or
misleading consumers because the companies have not provided a
fair and balanced picture of the advertised drug.1 8
Compounding the misleading effects of the majority of DTC
ads, opponents argue consumers will have difficulty accurately
weighing the side effects in a condensed television or radio ad and
comprehending the highly technical nature of the information
provided in printed brief summaries. 219 However, the nature of
214 See Nancy Chockley, supra note 146, at 19A.
25 Amy Slugg Moore, DTC Pharmaceutical Ads May Confuse Readers, RN,
June 1, 2000, at 16; David W. Glasscoff, The Internet and Pharmaceuticals,
MARKETING HEALTH SERV., Spring 2000, at 37 ("The impact of DTC advertising
on the medical community is that it seems to increase ... the 'pill-for-
everything' mentality that might not constitute 'good medicine."'). Moreover,
consumer-patients are often inclined not even to see and read the fine print
containing all the risks of pharmaceuticals. See Michael F. Conlan, Many
Consumers Ill-Informed About Rxs, Says AARP, DRUG ToPics, June 5, 2000, at
20 ("While 65% of all consumers said they had seen a printed DTC ad, one in
three of them reported not noticing the 'small-print' information about risks and
potential side effects. Only 34% of those who noticed the small print reported
reading it.").
216 Study Shows Positive Action, Attitude, from TV Drug Ads, 35 MED.,
MARKETING & MEDIA 26 (2000) (reporting that 62% of consumers responding
to a survey found DTC ads to be "trustworthy").
217 Id.
218 Janice Turner, A New RX for Drugs, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 10, 1999
(noting that in 1998, the FDA had to reprimand pharmaceutical companies
repeatedly for making false claims).
219 See Newman, supra note 195, at 92. Dr. Brian Strom, a professor at the
University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine says the following:
Drugs are too difficult for patients to understand, dosing is hard to
understand, and assessment of disease is best done by a doctor ....
Patients are not the ones qualified to make an assessment of what they
need. The whole thing ads up to no benefits and lots of harm.
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pharmaceuticals requires a careful balance of a patient's history and
the specific drug's risks to ensure maximum safety.22° Under a
managed care system, where doctors have less time with patients,
doctors are spending more time explaining the information from
advertisements than diagnosing patients.22' Often doctors just
prescribe the requested drug instead of taking time to discourage
the patient and inform her that there is a better, cheaper alterna-
tive.222 The patient may receive the wrong medication as a
result.
223
Newman, supra note 195, at 92.
220 Grace L. Johnson & Arkalgud Ramaprasad, Patient-Physician Relation-
ships in the Information Age, MARKETING HEALTH SERV., Spring 2000, at 21.
Critics claim that [health information is] virtually impossible for the
vast majority of non-professionally educated patients to adequately
understand, assimilate, and mentally process ... The following
example involving promotion of drugs in the antihypertensive market
illustrates this point. One alpha-blocker manufacturer promotes its
brand using the "alpha advantage"; another company emphasizes the
beta difference; a third company promotes its brand by emphasizing
once-a-day dosing; while a fourth explains that a major factor in
hypertension is fluid retention and that its product is the "most potent
diuretic (fluid reducer) on the market." Can a patient be expected to
comprehend or sort the many issues put forward by these messages?
A physician presumably chooses a particular treatment based on a
tradeoff between costs and benefits and the appropriate treatment-
patient match on an individual basis. Information that the patient
obtains and brings could upset this careful "therapeutic marketing
equilibrium."
Id.
221 See David W. Glascoff, The Internet and Pharmaceuticals, MARKETING
HEALTH SERVICES, Spring 2000, at 37 (suggesting "that the role of the physician
might seem (to the physician) as changing from skilled diagnostician to that of
a waiter in a restaurant serving what the patient 'orders"'); Rx Video, supra, note
201, at 1.
222 See Dana James, Prescription for Sale, MARKETING NEWS TM, Oct. 23,
2000 ("Drug companies' mass media advertising may be luring patients to newer,
more expensive drugs when less expensive alternatives would work just as
well."); Johnson, supra note 220, at 21 ("Physicians also fear the demands of
time on already tight schedules made by aggressive patients who insist on
discussing their discoveries.").
223 See Johnson, supra note 220, at 21 (noting that critics of DTC advertising
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Finally, DTC advertisements have been heavily criticized
because they drive up the cost of prescription medications, which
are already costly commodities. 4 Many argue that consumers
are the ones who ultimately pay for the information they receive
from these advertisements and that these dollars are better put
towards research and development of new pharmaceuticals. 225 For
these reasons, critics feel society would be better off without DTC
advertisements.6 While it appears DTC advertisements are here
to stay,227 the question remains, however, as to how the courts
will handle future failure to warn claims against advertising
pharmaceutical companies. Courts should heed and weigh these
benefits and risks of DTC advertising, as well as the interplay of
the FDA regulations, in deciding whether to create an exception to
the learned intermediary doctrine.
warn that "chances for problems ... such as overmedication and drug abuse,
increase with greater patient awareness").
224 Milt Freudenheim, New Focus Put on Old Debate of Controlling Drug
Costs, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2000, at 12A ("[D]rug spending is growing three
times as fast as overall health spending, which rose about 6% in 1999.");
Chockley, supra note 146, at 19A ("[Tihere is equal evidence that, thanks to
advertising's success in getting the doctors to prescribe new high-priced
drugs-whether they're needed or not-we are all paying a multi-billion dollar
price."). But cf. James G. Dickinson, DTC Spending Booms; DTC Doesn't Lift
Rx Prices, MED., MARKETING & MEDIA, May 1, 2000, at 34 ("New research
sponsored indirectly by pharmaceutical manufacturers says that increased
prescription drug spending is primarily due to the increased use of medicines
rather than higher prices or the impact of DTC advertising.").
225 See, e.g., Media Drives Public Awareness, CHEMIST & DRUGGIST, June
24, 2000, at 6; Linda Marsa, Out of Reach? The Rise in Drug Prices Is Causing
the Public to Ask Why, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2000, at S 1.
226 See Chockley, supra note 146, at 19A ("[T]he marketing success of drug
firms carries a significant downside for health care consumers . ... [W]ildly
escalating drug costs are crippling the ability of health plans to provide us with
affordable health care coverage.").
227 See, e.g., Glascoff, supra note 221, at 37 ("DTC advertising exists and
will continue to exist in some form.").
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B. The Four Options for Courts
As long as manufacturers of a prescription drugs communicate
directly to consumers through advertisements, courts will continue
to face the complex question of whether an exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine should be adopted. In so deciding,
courts should perform a social risk-utility test for DTC marketing
by examining whether the social benefits outweigh the harms and
by how much. They should also consider the societal and judicial
effects of either embracing or abandoning a well-grounded
doctrine,228 as well as the effects on DTC advertising itself. If the
court decides an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine is
warranted, it should then decide what deference to afford governing
FDA regulations. 229 This decision, in large part, should be based
on balancing the regulations' effectiveness in deterring misinforma-
tion with the benefits the existing advertisements provide.
1. No Exception to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine
If the deciding court weighs the benefits of the DTC advertising
significantly over the risks, it should not create an exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine. Holding otherwise would discourage
the advertisements, conceivably denying consumers valuable health
information. 23" The learned intermediary doctrine protects phar-
maceutical manufacturers from exposure to numerous lawsuits, thus
giving them the freedom to advertise directly to consumers without
becoming social insurers of their marketed products.231 If an
228 See supra note 1 (listing a sample of cases where courts have adhered to
the learned intermediary doctrine).
229 See supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text (discussing the FDA
regulations for DTC marketing).
130 See Jack B. Harrison & Mina J. Jerrerson, "Some Accurate Information
Is Better than No Information at All": Arguments Against Exceptions to the
Learned Intermediary Doctrine Based on Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 78
OR. L. REv. 605 (1999); Allen, supra note 204, at 130; Noah, supra note 54, at
141.
213' Allen, supra note 204, at 130.
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exception to the learned intermediary doctrine were created, many
pharmaceutical companies, particularly those manufacturing newer,
cutting-edge drugs, would not advertise for fear of opening
themselves up to endless litigation.232 In our evolving health care
system, a reduction in such health information could force
consumer-patients to rely completely on busy physicians with
whom they have developed little rapport.233 Advocates of the
learned intermediary doctrine believe that arming a consumer with
some information is far superior than depriving her of all informa-
234tion.
Moreover, with the learned intermediary doctrine intact,
pharmaceutical companies avoid wading into the nebulous waters
of determining what warnings are adequate, leaving such determi-
Imposing of legal liability for failure to warn the consumer of risks
would have a 'chilling effect' on the use of direct-to-consumer
advertisements. Pharmaceutical manufacturers provide many needed
products which have immensely improved the quality and duration of
life .... The potential liability associated with abandoning the learned
intermediary doctrine in advertising cases would most assuredly
minimize the use of this potentially beneficial activity.
Allen, supra note 204, at 130.
232 Allen, supra note 204, at 130 (illustrating past examples of how exposing
pharmaceutical manufacturers of new vaccinations to liability cut down on the
availability of those drugs and hypothesizing that the same result would occur
if an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine is created for DTC
advertising); see also Harrison & Jerrerson, supra note 230, at 623.
In an attempt to avoid future litigation manufacturers may stop
advertising if they believe litigation costs will outweigh the sales
expected from marketing their products. Courts, however, disfavor
keeping consumers in the dark because informed consumers are
reflective of an informed citizenry.
Harrison & Jerrerson, supra note 230, at 623.
233 Furthermore, physicians may be inclined to give patients who have seen
DTC ads less medical information because the duty has been shifted to the
manufacturer. See Noah, supra note 54, at 178.
234 See Noah, supra note 54, at 178 ("Direct advertising encourages active
participation by consumers in prescribing decisions, a favorable development that
courts should not 'reward' by expanding tort duties of drug manufacturers and,
thereby, discouraging such advertising in the future."); see also Harrison &
Jerrerson, supra note 230, at 605.
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nations entirely to the legislative process and prescribing physi-
cians. 235 If a pharmaceutical company chooses to advertise
without the protection the doctrine affords, it is placed in the
awkward position of determining which warnings are necessary for
a consumer-patient to make an informed choice.236 The company
will hence end up spreading the costs of litigation to the consumers
themselves, or it will deplete funding for drug research and
development. 37 Preservation of the learned intermediary doctrine
prevents such mayhem and safeguards the free flow of information
from manufacturer to consumer about various health options.238
2. An Exception to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine with a
Strong Rebuttable Presumption
Most of the advocates for adhering to the learned intermediary
doctrine in light of DTC advertising have not addressed the
benefits of using the FDA guidelines as determinative of liability
as the New Jersey Supreme Court did in Perez v. Wyeth Laborato-
235 See Noah, supra note 54, at 174-175.
236 Allen, supra note 204, at 129.
[A]ttempts in a direct-to-consumer ad to adequately convey sufficient
information to enable a consumer to make a reasonably informed and
educated decision would be prohibitively lengthy and difficult to
convey. As an example, the Food and Drug Administration's mandated
physician information required for a popular oral contraceptive contains
over eight hundred lines of text. Additionally, serious difficulties are
present in attempting to translate the complexities and subtleties of
medical terminology and consumer usable information.
Allen, supra note 204, at 129; see also Noah, supra note 54, at 176 n.131. The
author notes that "adequate consumer labeling cannot be designed for
prescription drugs" and cites Dunkin v. Syntex Lab, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121, 123
(W.D. Tenn. 1977), which states that "prescription drugs are sold on a
prescription basis and not over-the-counter because of the special expertise of a
trained physician necessary for their safe use." Noah, supra note 54, at 176
n. 131. As a result, an effective warning could only go to "the medical profession,
and not to an untrained patient." Noah, supra note 54, at 176 n.131.
237 Harrison & Jerrerson, supra note 230, at 623-24 (noting that consumers
pay the ultimate price of creating an exception to the learned intermediary
doctrine).
238 See Allen, supra note 204, at 129.
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ries.239 If a court should decide the underlying assumptions
behind the learned intermediary doctrine no longer apply in our
evolving health care system, an exception can be created without
all of the negative repercussions. 240 By creating a rebuttable
presumption against the plaintiff that the defendant manufacturer
has met its duty in complying with FDA regulations, the risks
presented by creating the exception - for example, depriving
consumers of valuable health information - are minimized.24'
The manufacturer, having the FDA guidelines as a powerful shield,
will not face the open-ended lawsuits that will deter it from
advertising or that will divert massive funding away from valuable
research and development of new drugs.242 In deciding whether
to create a strong or weak rebuttable presumption - in other
words, whether the plaintiff must prove deliberate FDA violations
- courts should consider which option will deter manufacturers
from misleading the public without infringing upon the benefits the
advertisements provide.
The New Jersey Supreme Court struck a balance between the
utility and harms of DTC advertising by recognizing an exception
to the learned intermediary doctrine but requiring plaintiff consum-
ers to rebut a strong presumption that defendant has satisfied its
duty to warn by complying with FDA mandates.243 The court set
forth a strong rebuttable presumption by stating that "absent
deliberate concealment or nondisclosure of after-acquired knowl-
edge of harmful effects, compliance with FDA standards should be
virtually dispositive of such claims.",2' The court's decision
rested, in part, on an implicit notion that DTC advertisements
benefit more than harm society. 245 It noted that, while these ads
239 See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text (discussing the threshold
FDA guideline presumption established in Perez).
240 See generally Perez, 734 A.2d at 1259.
241 Id. (noting that this approach prevents manufacturers from being made
insurers of their products).
242 See Dreier, supra note 21, at 825 (noting that plaintiffs claims will likely
not survive summary judgment when the manufacturer can hide behind its FDA
compliance).
243 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1259.
244 Id.
245 Id.
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do help educate the public, over-deterrence could have a "signifi-
cant anti-utilitarian effect.,
246
By allowing defendant manufacturers to use FDA regulations
as shields against liability and by creating a strong rebuttable
presumption for plaintiffs to surmount, the decision will not likely
alter the existing format of DTC advertisements.247 However, it
will force manufacturers to at least avoid deliberate FDA viola-
tions. 24' This could protect consumers from some of the blatantly
misleading information pharmaceutical manufacturers may
otherwise put in their advertisements. The threat of litigation will
likely deter manufacturers from blatant violations more so than the
current slap on the wrist the FDA imparts.249
3. An Exception to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine with a
Weak Rebuttable Presumption
If a court believes that a strong rebuttable presumption places
an insurmountable burden before the plaintiff and that the harmful
effects of existing DTC advertisements are at least equivalent to the
24 Id. Over-deterrence could discourage manufacturers from advertising at
all, thus depriving consumers of valuable health information. See Allen, supra
note 204, at 130 ("The potential liability associated with abandoning the learned
intermediary doctrine in advertising cases would most assuredly minimize the use
of this potentially beneficial activity.").
247 See Fushman, supra note 14, at 1181 (noting that the Perez decision will
not likely impact current DTC advertising).
248 Id. (surmising that manufacturers will likely submit their ads to the FDA
for pre-approval before airing or printing, a process which could delay ads
reaching the public for a number of weeks).
249 See Terzian, supra note 10, at 153. The FDA does not require pre-
approval of advertisements from pharmaceutical manufacturers before they are
printed or aired. Terzian, supra note 10, at 153. If the FDA finds a violation, the
administration issues a letter of reprimand to the company telling them to change
the ad so that it complies with regulations. Terzian, supra note 10, at 153. If the
manufacturer does not react appropriately to this warning, the FDA will then
require the advertisement be pulled off the air or out of print. Terzian, supra note
10, at 153. The FDA has the power to bring criminal sanctions, but this rarely
occurs. Terzian, supra note 10, at 153.
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250utilitarian effects, it may take the Perez decision one step
further and impose only a weak rebuttable presumption against the
plaintiff. Under a weak rebuttable presumption, the plaintiff must
only prove that the pharmaceutical manufacturer did not comply
with current FDA guidelines regardless of their intentional or
deliberate acts. This is the optimal approach, as manufacturers will
likely give great attention and deference to the FDA guidelines if
they face potentially numerous lawsuits for non-compliance." 1
They will strive to present a more accurate balance of risks and
benefits as the guidelines dictate, thus maximizing the educational
benefits of DTC advertisements while idealistically minimizing the
risks of false or deceptive marketing schemes.252 As a result, the
advertisements will better serve the public. 3
While some manufacturers may choose not to advertise at all
under such a scheme, the likelihood of deterrence from advertising
is not overwhelming. 54 Manufacturers have the FDA regulations
as a shield, although courts and juries will likely spend much more
time scrutinizing the regulations to determine compliance or non-
compliance.255 The most significant potential downfall, however,
is that manufacturers will divert research and development funds
to litigate against claims that they failed to meet FDA guide-
250 See Dreier, supra note 21, at 806 (arguing that the rebuttable presumption
placed before a plaintiff as a result of Perez "stifles any claim" because "absent
such fraud or concealment ... it would be highly unusual if any plaintiffs case
is able to survive a motion for summary judgment").
25' See generally Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of
Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 329-35 (1985)
(opining that FDA guidelines should be used as the standard for liability).
252 id.
253 See Fushman, supra note 14, at 1181 (suggesting that, in gaining pre-
approval from the FDA before airing or printing ads, the public will receive
more balanced, less misleading information).
254 See Fushman, supra note 14, at 1181 (opining that the increased revenues
resulting from DTC advertisements will outweigh any deterrence to cease DTC
marketing as a result of Perez).
255 See Fushman, supra note 14, at 1181 (noting that manufacturers can
avoid some of this by seeking pre-approval from the FDA).
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lines.256 Consumers will also bear these costs through increased
drug prices. 7
4. An Exception to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine with No
Rebuttable Presumption
Courts determining that the harmful effects of DTC marketing
significantly outweigh the benefits should adopt an exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine without imposing a rebuttable
presumption upon the plaintiff. While manufacturers will certainly
emphasize compliance with FDA regulations as evidence of
adequate warnings, such compliance will not shield them against
liability. 258 The nebulous question of what constitutes an adequate
warning will thus be before a court and jury, and the manufacturer
will face imposing burdens of justifying why a specific warning
was not presented thoroughly in a thirty-second advertisement.
259
Facing such open-ended lawsuits and liabilities, many manufac-
turers who decide the benefits do not outweigh the costs will cease
advertising altogether.260 As a result, consumers may be spared
some of the deceptive marketing schemes and the added costs of
advertising.26' Physicians will gain more autonomy in selecting
prescriptions without being bombarded by patients' requests.262
Those manufacturers who do choose to advertise will have to
256 See Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability:
Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461, 467-468 (1997)
(describing how the litigation itself costs manufacturers billions of dollars).
257 See generally supra notes and accompanying text 194-95 (noting the
already exorbitant costs of prescription drugs).
258 See generally Green, supra note 256, at 508.
259 See generally Huber, supra note 251, at 329-35 (questioning whether the
courts are appropriate vehicles for determining the limits of societal risks and
opining that government agencies, such as the FDA, are better suited for dealing
with these issues).
260 See Allen, supra note 204, at 130 (describing the "chilling effect" that the
pharmaceutical industry would have in the face of unfettered lawsuits).
261 See Allen, supra note 204, at 130.
262 See generally supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text (explaining the
negative effects of DTC advertisements on the limited amount of time physicians
and patients spend together).
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examine carefully their presentations of risks to consumers, thus
increasing the educational benefits of the remaining advertise-
ments.263
Advocates of such an exception argue that patients are entitled
to all the benefits and risks in order to make an informed choice in
taking a prescription medication, and that courts should impose
reasonableness standards to ensure this.26 Moreover, pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers who choose to advertise directly to consumers
incur a responsibility to warn them adequately and reasonably.265
While this viewpoint has merit in theory, critics note the immense,
impractical uncertainties of placing the question of what constitutes
reasonableness before a jury.266 As mentioned, "[p]rescription
drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula and
varied in effect. ' '267 The variety of different standards of reason-
ableness could overwhelm manufacturers and serve as an effective
deterrent.268 The FDA with its expertise is better suited to deal
with these uncertainties if DTC advertisements are found to have
more than minimal social value.
C. The Optimal Choice: Option 3
While the ultimate decision of how best to handle future
challenges to the learned intermediary doctrine in light of pharma-
ceutical companies' massive DTC marketing campaigns rests with
the courts, Option 3 presents the best balance for courts to follow.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized valid arguments for
creating an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine.269
When the underlying reasons behind the doctrine are diminished,
as in the case of DTC advertising, an exception is warranted with
263 See generally supra notes 195-203 and accompanying text (comparing the
educational benefits of DTC advertising on the public).
264 See, e.g., Plant, supra note 14, at 1007 (advocating an informed consent
doctrine).
265 Plant, supra note 14, at 1007.
266 See supra note 236.
267 See supra note 53.
268 See supra note 236.
269 Perez, 734 A.2d at 1259.
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limitations.270 A judge or jury, however, is not best suited to
determine the arbitrary and complex question of what constitutes
an adequate warning in DTC advertising. Therefore, adopting the
FDA guidelines as the standard of reasonableness strikes a rational
and fair balance to both plaintiffs and manufacturers.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, on the other hand, went too far
in requiring plaintiffs to prove deliberate concealment.27' A
plaintiffs burden is virtually insurmountable under such a mandate.
Under Option 3 a plaintiff will have a claim that survives summary
judgment if she can prove that the manufacturer failed to comply
with the FDA guidelines. She need not prove deliberate conceal-
ment, as under Perez, thus her burden is lessened. For those
plaintiffs who have truly been misled by overtly deceptive
advertising, a remedy exists. Moreover, manufacturers will be
forced to take a close look at their advertisements to ensure FDA
compliance.
This option will have the salutary effect of preserving the
benefits of DTC advertising while diminishing some of its harms.
The justified concern over the misleading nature of DTC ads will
be lessened as manufacturers who wish to advertise will seek pre-
approval from the FDA. At the same time, the advertisements will
continue to provide valuable health information to the public by
increasing awareness and reducing stigmas. In this new and
changing age of health care, where targeted consumers have
stepped at least partially into the shoes of learned intermediaries,
such an exception with boundaries is warranted.
CONCLUSION
The learned intermediary doctrine, relieving prescription drug
manufacturers from the duty of warning consumers directly,
remains a sound rule in products liability as prescription drugs are
270 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt.
b (1998) ("In certain limited therapeutic relationships the physician or care-giver
has a much diminished role as an evaluator or decision-maker. In these instances
it may be appropriate to impose on the manufacturer a duty to warn the patient
directly.").
271 Id.; see also Dreier, supra note 15.
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complex in nature and warnings are difficult to convey. Limited
exceptions, however, are warranted when the assumption that the
prescribing physician will adequately convey warnings is not
present. For these reasons, courts have recognized the validity of
exceptions for a mass immunizations and contraceptives. Further
embracing this rationale, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Perez
v. Wyeth Laboratories was the first to extend an exception to the
learned intermediary doctrine to situations where the manufacturer
has engaged in DTC marketing.
As a result of the movement in health care towards a system of
managed care, the dynamics between physicians and patients have
changed. Now, patients do not have the limitless freedom to choose
their physicians and physicians are not able to devote the same
amount of time to individual patients. Pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers, on the other hand, have begun reaching patients directly and
inundating them with product information through print and media
advertisements and informational Internet web sites. As a result,
patients often tell their physicians which prescription medication
they wish to take, sometimes reducing physicians into mere
purveyors of prescription slips. To an extent, consumers have
stepped into the roles that intermediaries once filled.
In addressing the learned intermediary doctrine when the
manufacturer has engaged in DTC advertising, courts should
consider the societal value of the ads themselves. On one hand,
these advertisements notify consumers of valuable health informa-
tion that their physicians may not provide and enable patients to
make informed choices concerning individual health care. On the
other hand, these advertisements often are deceptive and manipula-
tive, minimizing complex side effects and contraindications of the
product. In reaching a solution, courts should consider what option
would maximize the positive effects of DTC advertising, while
minimizing the negative consequences. The solution, presented in
Option 3, allows for a limited exception to the learned intermediary
doctrine. While, under this solution, the manufacturer bears the
duty to warn the consumer directly, it can use the FDA regulations
as a shield against liability. Any plaintiff bringing a failure to warn
claim against a pharmaceutical manufacturer will have to rebut a
presumption that the manufacturer complied with FDA regulations.
Absent proof of a violation of the FDA guidelines, a plaintiffs
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claim will not survive summary judgment. Manufacturers will have
incentive to follow strictly the regulations set forth by the FDA,
and the consumers will have legitimate claims against manufactur-
ers for non-compliance. Moreover, the nebulous question of what
constitutes a reasonable warning will rest in the hands of the able
FDA experts. As a result, manufacturers will continue to advertise
and inform consumers in a more balanced approach, and consumers
will continue to take charge of their own health care decisions.

